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 This article defends what it refers to as 
“inference causation”: a fact-finder’s drawing of 
a causal link between a defendant’s actions and 
a plaintiff’s suffering in tort claims in the ab-
sence of expert scientific evidence.  
 This type of reasoning, affirmed in 1990 by 
Justice Sopinka in the Supreme Court of Can-
ada decision, Snell v. Farrell, has encountered 
significant academic criticism. The author de-
fends inference causation by considering evi-
dence theory. First, he shows that inference 
causation forms a part of law’s veritism—its 
commitment to the truth—since legal fact-
finding’s aim is always to seek out the best ob-
tainable truth, rather than the absolute truth. 
Second, he critiques the primacy of scientific 
evidence by showing that both its reasoning 
process and the nature of its conclusions are dif-
ferent from those of legal fact-finding. Last, the 
author shows that all fact-finding—particularly 
all legal fact-finding—is already inferential. 
Scientific evidence forms but one of many dif-
ferent elements that are analyzed by fact-
finders in their inference about which factual 
account of the disputed events is the best ac-
count. Accordingly, where none is available, the 
same inference of fact is nonetheless possible. 
Cet article défend l’« inférence de 
causalité », le fait d’établir un lien de causalité 
entre les actes du défendeur et le préjudice subi 
par le demandeur en l’absence de preuve 
scientifique d’expert dans le cadre d’une 
poursuite en responsabilité extracontractuelle. 
 Ce type de raisonnement, approuvé en 
1990 par le juge Sopinka dans l’arrêt Snell c. 
Farrell de la Cour suprême du Canada, a depuis 
été vivement critiqué par la doctrine. L’auteur 
le défend par une étude de la théorie de la 
preuve. D’abord, il démontre que l’inférence de 
causalité s’inscrit dans la mission de recherche 
de la vérité du droit, puisque le but de la 
recherche juridique des faits est de parvenir 
aussi près de la vérité que possible et non 
d’atteindre la vérité absolue. Ensuite, il critique 
la primauté de la preuve scientifique puisque sa 
méthode et la nature de ses conclusions 
diffèrent de celles de la recherche juridique des 
faits. Finalement, l’auteur démontre que la 
constatation des faits, en particulier la 
constatation juridique des faits, inclut déjà 
l’inférence. La preuve scientifique n’est qu’un 
élément parmi plusieurs que le juge des faits 
analyse pour déduire le meilleur compte rendu 
possible des faits en litige. Ainsi, quand aucune 
preuve scientifique ne peut être établie, il est 
néanmoins légitime de recourir à l’inférence. 
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Introduction  
 My aim in this paper is to justify what I shall refer to as “inference 
causation” in the tort of negligence. At stake is the proposition that, 
where scientific expert evidence is unable to verify a causal link between 
a defendant’s creation of risk and a plaintiff’s suffering, a legal fact-finder 
may infer such a link.  
 My account of inference causation will avoid the well-worn paths of 
causation theory, drawing instead from theoretical considerations of evi-
dence and of its role in the fact-finding process. Canadian legal tradition 
has not embraced (or given much consideration to) a theory of evidence as 
it pertains to legal fact-finding.1 Moreover, tort lawyers have shown no in-
terest in exploring how evidence theory might relate to inference causa-
tion, perhaps because evidence merely provides the basis for finding or 
not finding cause-in-fact. Such indifference is, however, misplaced. Such a 
convention does not, for example, explain trial phenomena.2 More to the 
point, it does not account for the uncertain threshold of civil proof that 
equates mere probability with certainty, nor the processes of logical rea-
soning that legal fact-finders bring to a trial. In short, it fails to account 
for the distinction between the nature of cause-in-fact, and what is re-
quired to prove cause-in-fact. My rationale, then, for introducing theoreti-
cal evidence scholarship to the debate within tort law about inference cau-
sation is that evidence theory takes this distinction seriously by explicitly 
accounting for the standard of proof and the epistemology of legal fact-
finding. It therefore injects an air of adjudicative reality into the discourse 
on inference causation. 
 The express genesis of inference causation3 within Canadian law con-
stitutes only one element within Canadian torts jurisprudence out of an 
emerging array of non-exclusive tests4 for assessing whether a plaintiff 
has discharged the requirement of proving cause-in-fact. I should there-
                                                  
1   For a notable exception, see Marilyn MacCrimmon, “Developments in the Law of Evi-
dence: The 1988-89 Term: The Process of Proof: Schematic Constraints” (1990) 1 Sup. 
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 345 [MacCrimmon, “Law of Evidence”]; Marilyn MacCrimmon, “What is 
‘Common’ about Common Sense?: Cautionary Tales for Travelers Crossing Disciplinary 
Boundaries” (2001) 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1433 [MacCrimmon, “Common Sense”]. 
2   For a discussion of some of these trial phenomena, see text accompanying note 92. 
3   I say “express”, as I will be arguing that inference causation has always been an imma-
nent element of legal fact-finding. 
4   Vaughan Black, “Decision Causation: Pandora’s Tool-Box” in Jason W. Neyers, Erika 
Chamberlain & Stephen G.A. Pitel, eds., Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2007) 309 (“this new attitude is what we might call the array approach” at 309). See 
also Kuwait Airways v. Iraqi Airways (Nos. 4 and 5), [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 A.C. 883 
at 1106, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1353, Lord Hoffman. 
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fore take care at the outset to distinguish what I am setting out to eluci-
date from what I am not. I will therefore begin by situating inference cau-
sation within recent Canadian jurisprudence on cause-in-fact. Having dis-
tinguished inference causation (or at least its current doctrinal expres-
sion) within that body of law, I will recount various criticisms that have 
been levelled in respect of inference causation. A substantial portion of 
what follows will be devoted to responding to each of those criticisms in 
turn. Ultimately, however, my aim is justificatory, and to that end I will 
conclude by offering an account for inference causation, grounded in the 
characteristics of evidence, and in the demonstrated cognitive processing 
that legal fact-finders apply to that evidence. 
I. The Jurisprudence and the Objections 
A. Inference Causation’s Place in Canadian Jurisprudence 
 The array of tests available in Canada to plaintiffs for proving cause-
in-fact comprise the material contribution to risk test, the material con-
tribution to harm test, and the but-for test.5 The first test, which appears 
obiter dicta in the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent pronouncement in 
Hanke, is said to be available to a fact-finder where “factors that are out-
side of the plaintiff’s control” such as “current limits of scientific knowl-
edge” make it, in part, impossible for the plaintiff to prevail using the but-
for test.6 The second test, the material contribution to harm test, was de-
scribed in Athey as being available where the but-for test is “unwork-
able”.7 In contrast to Hanke’s exclusive focus on augmentation of mere 
risk, Athey’s test allows a plaintiff to succeed only where the defendant’s 
negligence “materially contributed” to the occurrence of the actual injury.8  
                                                  
5   For my conceptualization of these tests, see Russell Brown, “Material Contribution’s 
Expanding Hegemony: Factual Causation after Hanke v. Resurfice Corp.” (2007) 45 
Can. Bus. L.J. 432 [Brown, “Expanding Hegemony”]. For the material contribution to 
harm test, see ibid. at 434-38. See also Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 140 D.L.R. 
(4th) 235 [Athey cited to S.C.R.]; Walker Estate v. York-Finch General Hospital, 2001 
SCC 23, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 647, 198 D.L.R. (4th) 193. For the material contribution to risk 
test, see Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 2007 SCC 7, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, 278 D.L.R. (4th) 643 
[Hanke]. 
6   “It must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care ... exposing the plaintiff to 
an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have suffered that form of injury”: 
ibid. at para. 25. 
7   Athey, supra note 5 at 466. 
8   Ibid. This conception of “material contribution” is distinct from a nearly forgotten, more 
orthodox conception that was expressed as recently as Myers v. Peel County Board of 
Education ([1981] 2 S.C.R. 21, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 1). See David Cheifetz, “The Snell Infer-
ence and Material Contribution: Defining the Indefinable and Hunting the Causative 
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 In Canadian tort jurisprudence, however, the third test—the orthodox, 
counterfactual, sine qua non but-for test requiring proof on a balance of 
probabilities9—retains primacy. Even within Athey and Hanke, the but-for 
test was not only affirmed as the presumptive test for proving cause-in-
fact,10 but was also applied. To the extent that any post-Hanke trend is 
discernible, it is characterized by a marked judicial reluctance to conclude 
that the but-for test is “unworkable” (per Athey)11 or “impossible” (per 
Hanke),12 thereby dooming the claims of plaintiffs unable to meet its more 
stringent requirement of showing a probable and necessary causal link 
between their suffering and a defendant’s negligence.13  
 The ongoing primacy of the but-for test is largely due to the subsisting 
influence of the 1990 pronouncement of Justice Sopinka for the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Snell v. Farrell,14 and his explicit recognition of infer-
ence causation as the means by which the but-for test is to be applied in 
cases of factual uncertainty. In Snell, the plaintiff, in her seventies by the 
time of trial, underwent surgery to remove a cataract. A retrobulbar hem-
orrhage that was visible to the defendant surgeon occurred during the 
surgery. Although the hemorrhage itself was not a result of negligence, 
the trial judge found that the defendant’s failure to abort the surgery 
upon discovering the hemorrhage was unreasonable. By the time the 
      
Snark” (2005) 30 Advocates’ Q. 1 at 83 [Cheifetz, “Causative Snark”]; Jane Stapleton, 
“Lords a’Leaping Evidentiary Gaps” (2002) 10 Torts L.J. 276 at 282-83 [Stapleton, 
“Lords a’Leaping”]; Brown, “Expanding Hegemony”, supra note 5 at 309. This older 
conception recognized that factors additional to the defendant’s negligence that also 
contributed to the plaintiff’s injury would not, in and of themselves, preclude the defen-
dant’s liability.  
9   Re B. (Children), [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 A.C. 11, [2008] 4 All E.R. 1; F.H. v. 
McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, 297 D.L.R. (4th) 193. 
10   Athey, supra note 5 at 466 (the “general” test); Hanke, supra note 5 at para. 21 (the 
“basic” test). 
11   Athey, supra note 5 at 466. 
12   Hanke, supra note 5 at para. 25. 
13   Indeed, by giving no serious consideration to the meaning of these threshold terms, Ca-
nadian courts skirt the thorny normative questions of whether and when the but-for 
test ought to be abandoned in certain cases. Even in the relatively few instances where 
plaintiffs have been able to overcome evidentiary “gaps” due to scientific uncertainty, 
they have done so in most cases not on the basis of the alternative tests for proving 
cause-in-fact, but rather because they were viewed as having discharged the but-for 
test. See Russell Brown, “Material Contribution’s Expanding Hegemony (Or, Where 
Are We and How Did We Get Here?)” in Continuing Legal Education Society of British 
Columbia, ed., Causation in Tort After Resurfice (Vancouver, June 2008) 2.1.1 at 2.1.11-
14.  
14   [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 289 [Snell cited to S.C.R.]. 
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plaintiff’s vitreous chamber cleared (nine months later), the plaintiff’s op-
tic nerve had atrophied to the point of blindness.  
 The cause-in-fact issue in Snell lay in the uncertain etiology of the op-
tic nerve atrophy. While it can result from retrobulbar hemorrhage, other 
possible causes of optic nerve atrophy include three conditions from which 
the plaintiff suffered: high blood pressure, diabetes, and severe glaucoma. 
Neither party’s expert was able to express an opinion on the cause of the 
atrophy. The trial judge applied Lord Wilberforce’s judgment in McGhee v. 
National Coal Board15 (where the defendant employer’s negligent failure 
to provide washing facilities for their workmen was one of several possible 
causes of the plaintiff’s dermatitis) to reverse the onus of proof and impose 
liability upon the defendant.16 Both the result and the reasoning were ap-
proved at the New Brunswick Court of Appeal.17  
 While affirming the judgment of the lower court, Justice Sopinka, for 
the Supreme Court of Canada, reviewed the five speeches in McGhee as 
well as the following speech of Lord Bridge of the House of Lords in Wil-
sher v. Essex Area Health Authority: 
 The conclusion I draw ... is that McGhee v. National Coal Board 
laid down no new principle of law whatever. On the contrary, it af-
firmed the principle that the onus of proving causation lies on the 
pursuer or plaintiff. Adopting a robust and pragmatic approach to 
the undisputed primary facts of the case, the majority concluded 
that it was a legitimate inference of fact that the defenders’ negli-
gence had materially contributed to the pursuer’s injury.18 
Elaborating on the desired “robust and pragmatic”19 approach to making 
common sense inferences, Justice Sopinka added that “the dissatisfaction 
with the traditional approach to causation stems to a large extent from its 
too rigid application by the courts in many cases. Causation need not be 
determined by scientific precision.”20 Justice Sopinka quoted Lord Salmon 
from Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward: it is “essentially a practical question of 
fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense rather than 
abstract metaphysical theory.”21 Justice Sopinka continued: 
                                                  
15   (1972), [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.) [McGhee]. 
16   Snell v. Farrell (1986), 77 N.B.R. (2d) 222, 195 A.P.R. 222 (Q.B.T.D.). 
17   Snell v. Farrell (1988), 84 N.B.R. (2d) 401, 214 A.P.R. 401 (C.A.). 
18   [1988] 2 W.L.R. 557 at 569, [1988] 1 All E.R. 871 (H.L.) [emphasis added, references 
omitted, Wilsher]. 
19   Ibid. 
20   Ibid. 
21   Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, [1972] A.C. 824 at 847, [1972] 2 All E.R. 475 [emphasis 
added], cited in Snell, supra note 14 at 328. 
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 The legal or ultimate burden remains with the plaintiff, but in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary adduced by the defendant, an 
inference of causation may be drawn although positive or scientific 
proof of causation has not been adduced.22 
 For Justice Sopinka and the Court, our limited scientific understand-
ing of what must have happened in a given occasion does not pose an in-
surmountable hurdle to the plaintiff. The absence of affirmative scientific 
evidence can be legitimately overcome by an inference of cause-in-fact 
from the “undisputed primary facts” of a case.23 More specifically, a causal 
link may be inferred where such an inference is supported by the avail-
able evidence, assessed in a “robust” and “pragmatic” fashion. We are told 
that this correction of our understanding of how to treat evidence should 
furnish a salutary amelioration of the “too rigid application” of the “tradi-
tional approach” to the but-for test.24 Therefore, instead of perpetuating a 
historical insistence upon a (curiously ambiguous) blend of “scientific pre-
cision” and “metaphysical theory”, Snell tells us that we should view the 
question of whether or not the evidence reveals a causal link between risk 
and suffering as “essentially a practical question of fact.”25  
 In sum, and irrespective of the ambiguity in his account of how cause-
in-fact used to be determined, Justice Sopinka’s statement made it clear 
that cause-in-fact would henceforth be determined by a process of inferen-
tial reasoning. Such reasoning would, in turn, draw from evidentiary 
treatment that would be both “pragmatic” and “robust”. Justice Sopinka 
then concluded in Snell that the evidence supported an inference that the 
defendant surgeon’s negligent failure to abort the surgery after discover-
ing the hemorrhage was the cause-in-fact of the optic nerve’s atrophy. 
 In this paper, I shall treat Justice Sopinka’s holding in Snell as the 
substance of inference causation,26 with the caveat that I will neither de-
fend nor rely upon Snell’s empty references to an approach that is “robust 
and pragmatic”, questions of fact that are “practical”, or “common sense”27 
                                                  
22   Snell, supra note 14 at 330. 
23   Ibid. at 324. 
24   Ibid. at 328. 
25   Ibid. 
26   The reasoning in Snell has since twice been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
See Laferrière v. Lawson, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 541, 78 D.L.R. (4th) 609; St-Jean v. Mercier, 
2002 SCC 15, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 491, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 513. 
27   Lara Khoury has attempted to rehabilitate a role for “common sense” in legal fact-
finding as reflecting the desired “[judicial] attitude ... towards the evidence,” but in do-
ing so affirms that it is no rationale for actual causal determination: Lara Khoury, Un-
certain Causation in Medical Liability (Oxford: Hart, 2006) at 202-203. 
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that is “ordinary”.28 That is, I have deprived myself of the rhetorical fudg-
ing that afflicts judicial discourse on cause-in-fact generally and on infer-
ence causation specifically,29 leaving me with only two reference points: 
the evidence, and whether it might (or might not) permit an inference of 
causal linkage to be drawn where “the doctors cannot identify the process 
of causation scientifically.”30 
B. Anticipating Objections and Looking to Evidence Theory 
 At present, and even within Canada where Snell still governs, legal 
scholars have expressed little support for inference causation generally31 
and Snell specifically.32 Although there has been substantial debate about 
the merits of the alternative tests of material contribution to harm and 
material contribution to risk,33 academic commentary has been almost 
                                                  
28   Here I am agreeing with Cheifetz: “Causative Snark”, supra note 8 at 49-51. 
29   See Vaughan Black, Book Review of Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability by Lara 
Khoury, (2008) 47 Can. Bus. L.J. 145 [Black, Book Review of Uncertain Causation] 
(“‘Robust and pragmatic’ are fudge words of the first degree” at 151). See also Mac-
Crimmon, “Common Sense”, supra note 1 (“Although frequently relied upon, common 
sense is seldom defined, nor is reliance on common sense justified” at 1435); Jane Sta-
pleton, “Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences” (2003) 119 Law Q. 
Rev. 388 at 388, citing Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 
[2003] 1 A.C. 32 at para. 45, [2002] 3 W.L.R. 89, Lord Nicholls [Fairchild]; Jane Staple-
ton, “Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v. Afshar” (2006) 122 Law 
Q. Rev. 426 at 426. 
30   Snell, supra note 14 at para. 22, citing Wilsher, supra note 18 at 567. 
31   For exceptions, see H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985) at 1, 23-61; Richard W. Wright, “Causation, Responsibility, 
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying 
the Concepts” (1988) 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001 at 1003, 1009, 1018 [Wright, “Bramble 
Bush”]. 
32   There are some prominent exceptions: Khoury, supra note 27 at 202-203; Allan Beever, 
Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart, 2007) at 489-92 [Beever, Rediscover-
ing]. 
33   For support of these alternative tests, see Allen M. Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Cana-
dian Tort Law, 8th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) at 120-23; Mitchell 
McInnes, “Causation in Tort Law: Back to Basics at the Supreme Court of Canada” 
(1997) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 1013; Craig Jones, “Riffing on Mass Torts, Risk & Uncertainty: 
Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke and Proof of Causation in Populations” in Continuing Legal 
Education Society of British Columbia, Causation in Tort After Resurfice (Vancouver, 
June 2008) 4.1.1. In opposition to these alternative tests, see Brown, “Expanding He-
gemony”, supra note 5; Cheifetz, “Causative Snark”, supra note 8; Gillian Demeyere, 
“The ‘Material Contribution’ Test: An Immaterial Contribution to Tort Law: A Com-
ment on Briglio v. Faulkner” (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317; Lewis Klar, “Downsizing 
Torts” in Nicholas J. Mullany & Hon. Allen M. Linden, eds., Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute 
to John Fleming (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1998) 305 at 311; Stapleton, 
“Lords a’Leaping”, supra note 8.  
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universally critical of inference causation.34 And, while Snell’s references 
to “common sense” and “robust[ness]” are seen as supplying the vocabu-
lary for baseless rationalization,35 the objections go beyond inference cau-
sation’s semantics. Put generally, the criticism is that either by design or 
in effect, inference causation excuses legal fact-finders from offering clear 
reasoning for a plaintiff’s recovery in the absence of evidence proving 
cause-in-fact to a probable standard. Intuitive fact-finding thus smacks of 
the same problem that Peter Birks discerned in “intuitive law-finding”—
specifically that “[i]t frees the judge from the shackles of traditional legal 
rationality.”36 The criticism levelled by Lewis Klar is generally represen-
tative of the scope of the various arguments, although more severe than 
most.37 Describing inference causation as a “more liberal and relaxed ap-
proach,”38 he explains: 
The effect of Snell v. Farrell on proving causation in cases where the 
scientific and expert evidence cannot establish a probable connection 
between a defendant’s negligence and a plaintiff’s injury has been 
significant. To allow an inference of cause to be drawn even where 
there is no scientific evidence of a probable connection between neg-
ligence and injury is in effect to accept the essential principle of 
McGhee via a different route.39 
The most recent edition of Klar’s critique omits the following passage, 
which appeared in an earlier edition: 
                                                  
34   Vaughan Black, “The Transformation of Causation in the Supreme Court: Dilution and 
‘Policyization’” in Todd Archibald & Michael Cochrane, eds., Annual Review of Civil 
Litigation 2002 (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) 187 at 195 [Black, “Policyization”]; Cheifetz, 
“Causative Snark”, supra note 8 at 49-54; John G. Fleming, “Probabilistic Causation in 
Tort Law” (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 661 at 670; Lewis N. Klar, Tort Law, 4th ed. (To-
ronto: Thomson Carswell, 2008) at 447 [Klar, Tort Law]; Stephen N. Pincus, “Progress 
on the Causal Chain Gang: Some Approaches to Causation in Tort Law and Steps To-
ward a Linguistic Analysis” (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 961 at 983; Jane Stapleton, 
“The Gist of Negligence, Part II: The Relationship Between ‘Damage’ and Causation” 
(1988) 104 Law Q. Rev. 389 at 404 [Stapleton, “The Gist of Negligence”]. A notable ex-
ception is Khoury (supra note 27). 
35   Black, Book Review of Uncertain Causation, supra note 29 at 151. 
36   Peter Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29 
U.W.A.L. Rev. 1 at 17 [emphasis added]. I will, however, suggest in concluding this pa-
per that inference causation is an instance of judgment, as distinguished from intuition. 
See text accompanying notes 213-15. 
37   Khoury describes Klar’s criticism (see text accompanying note 39) as “more assertive” 
(Khoury, supra note 27 at 166).  
38   Klar, Tort Law, supra note 34 at 447, n. 91. 
39   Ibid. at 446-47 [footnote omitted]. By “the essential principle of McGhee” (ibid. at 447), 
Klar is referring to Lord Wilberforce’s imposition in McGhee of a reverse onus, requiring 
the defendant to prove that his or her negligence did not cause the plaintiff’s injury 
(ibid. at 441-42). See also Khoury, supra note 27 at 166.  
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While [inference causation] may produce a pragmatic solution to a 
plaintiff’s dilemma in difficult causation cases, it does depart from 
the traditional “but for” test, and the balance of probability stan-
dard.40 
 This criticism of inference causation essentially advances three gen-
eral objections. First, it implicitly claims that inference causation is indif-
ferent to the law’s concern for veritism in fact-finding.41 Cause-in-fact is 
being established even in the absence of a probable connection between 
negligence and suffering.42 The point here is that, inasmuch as the law ac-
cepts as true only what is shown to be probable, any reasoning process 
that is indifferent to probability is necessarily indifferent to the law’s veri-
tistic aims. Second, it is argued that “scientific evidence” is privileged as 
being inherently reliable, or at least more reliable than an inference made 
without the benefit of scientific evidence.43 And third, critics argue that no 
legal fact-finder can legitimately infer cause-in-fact in the absence of such 
scientific evidence. Any defence of inference causation must take these ob-
                                                  
   There has been substantial debate about the meaning to be ascribed to McGhee, 
and particularly to Lord Reid’s speech; two mutually opposing views exist. See Staple-
ton, “Lords a’Leaping”, supra note 8 at 286-87; Beever, Rediscovering, supra note 32 at 
466-67. It is unnecessary for me to resolve this here, as I take Sopinka J.’s reasons in 
the later decision of Snell as my reference point. Nor do I propose to engage Stapleton’s 
additional criticism in “The Gist of Negligence” (supra note 34) in reference to the facts 
of McGhee, that “it is not clear why ... the common sense inference is in favour of a cu-
mulative cause mechanism rather than an alternative cause mechanism” (ibid. at 404). 
My justification of inference causation is indifferent to whether liability is cumulative or 
apportioned with other material sources of harm. 
40   Lewis Klar, Tort Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2003) at 403. As a matter of 
positive law, this is an incorrect statement. Inference causation is no derogation from 
the but-for test but is rather an epistemological instantiation of it. See text accompany-
ing note 22 (passage from Snell); David Cheifetz, “Materially Increasing the Risk of In-
jury as Factual Cause of Injury: Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. in Can-
ada” (2004) 29 Advocates’ Q. 253 (“Snell is a but-for case” at 263). However, given the 
text that precedes it, I take this as stating that inference causation has, in effect, re-
laxed the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden. Indeed, without explanation, Linden and Feld-
thusen describe this supposedly “relaxed” quality as lending it a “more balanced” and 
“humane” quality (supra note 33 at 119). 
41   Veritism is the law’s concern for evaluating a factual proposition by reference to its con-
formance to absolute truth. This term is devised from the work of Alvin Goldman, who 
specified that our drive to know presupposes a desire for truth (or at least for the closest 
approximation of truth)—a desire he labelled “veritistic”. “Veritistic epistemology is 
such a special field, where the selected good is knowledge and the selected bad are error 
and ignorance”: Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) at 6. 
42   See MacCrimmon, “Common Sense”, supra note 1 (“Justice ... totally dependent on un-
examined common sense is, to my mind, a fertile breeding ground for miscarriages of 
justice” at 1434-35). 
43   This is also the argument of Lord Rodger in Fairchild (supra note 29 at para. 150). 
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jections seriously, and in this paper, I will argue that such defences reflect 
a misunderstanding of the epistemic processes that are integral to scien-
tific fact-finding and legal fact-finding.  
 More specifically, in response to the first criticism that inference cau-
sation is indifferent to veritism in fact-finding, I will argue that this criti-
cism is simply wrong, inasmuch as it is grounded in a misapprehension of 
what it means for legal fact-finding to be veritistic. In addressing the sec-
ond criticism—that “scientific evidence” is a necessary precondition to re-
liable legal fact-finding—I will argue that scientific fact-finding, though 
potentially helpful to legal fact-finders, cannot be determinative of legal 
outcomes because it fails to account for the cognitive processes that are 
necessarily brought to bear upon evidence. Inference causation, I will 
show, is an unavoidable process in any causal inquiry because we never 
know with certainty whether the mechanism by which a risk could mate-
rialize into suffering was instantiated in a given case: legal fact-finders in-
fer (or do not infer) that it was. Inference causation’s immanence within 
legal fact-finding also helps answer the final criticism—that in the ab-
sence of scientific evidence, no legitimate inference of cause-in-fact can be 
made. I will, however, also attempt to bolster my response with reference 
to various criteria that have been emphasized by, inter alia, evidence 
theorists, psychologists, and epidemiologists for making reliable infer-
ences of causal association.  
 To some extent, this paper will merely affirm the legitimacy of current 
judicial practice: despite criticism, resort to inference causation has per-
sisted in Canadian jurisprudence. And, as Richard Wright reminds us, 
“judges and juries ... consistently have demonstrated an ability to make 
intuitively plausible factual causal determinations,” resulting in causal 
judgments that have inter se enjoyed “remarkable agreement”.44 I will be 
guided, however, by Wright’s caution that intuitions not conjoined with 
theory when searching for underlying principles “are often inadequate for 
the hard cases and sometimes may mislead even in the easy cases”;45 my 
task in addressing the final criticism will be not merely to reiterate judi-
cial practice, but also to theorize (albeit generally) the application of this 
shared but undefined causal conception.  
 In answering these criticisms of inference causation, I will take a 
slightly different path from that of Wright, whose theory explains how in-
ference causation is applied but does not seek to justify the reliance upon 
                                                  
44   Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1018. 
45   Ibid. at 1018-19. 
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it per se (except to show how it might be justly and rationally applied).46 
For Wright, to accept inference causation is to accept an epistemological 
standpoint that reasonable conclusions (or at least not obviously false, ar-
bitrary, or irrational conclusions) can be drawn from reliable evidence and 
rational processes of reasoning. This theory makes sense when one con-
siders that such processes occur within an adjudicative context that im-
poses a less-than-certain and merely probable threshold for proof. This is 
not to suggest that “context” should displace a serious analysis, but rather 
that its bar-setting function influences the epistemological project of ex-
plaining how inference qualifies as knowledge.  
 I therefore do not dispute Wright’s defence of inference causation. My 
argument instead delves a little more deeply into, inter alia, its presuppo-
sition of an uncertain threshold of civil proof within adjudication in gen-
eral, and legal fact-finding in particular. My account of how evidence is 
cognitively processed and juristically assessed will lead me to consider 
that a justification for the application of inference causation in legal fact-
finding might be found not in a theory of causation, but rather in a theory 
of evidence and its role in the fact-finding process. The inference of cause-
in-fact from evidence of possible correlation has been, after all, a substan-
tial epistemic concern among twentieth-century legal scholars of evi-
dence.47 It began with what William Twining called the “rationalist tradi-
tion”, which emphasized the role of generalizations in inferential fact-
finding,48 through to the “new” or “mathematicist” evidence scholarship, 
which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and maintained that inferential 
reasoning in the face of uncertainty is a species of probabilistic reason-
ing.49 Therefore, the advantage of drawing from theoretical evidence 
scholarship to inform tort lawyers’ debates about inference causation is 
that such a theory might account for the cognitive processing and juristic 
assessment of evidence in an adjudicative context. Here, I am taking as a 
                                                  
46   Wright comes closest to justifying intuitional causal judgment, as I describe it, in his re-
sponse to Mark Kelman’s pragmatic objections to his NESS test (ibid. at 1037). While 
he concedes that our imperfect knowledge means that legal fact-finders are sometimes 
unable to determine whether a condition is more than a mere condition such that it con-
tributed to the result, Wright argues that this point is irrelevant to the “appropriate 
theory of actual causation” (ibid.). Instead, “[a]s lawyers, judges, jurors, or lay persons, 
we do the best that we can” (ibid.). 
47   Peter Tillers, “Mapping Inferential Domains” (1986) 66 B.U.L. Rev. 883 at 883. 
48   William Twining, “The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship” in Enid Camp-
bell & Louis Waller, eds., Well and Truly Tried: Essays on Evidence in Honour of Sir 
Richard Eggleston (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1982) 211. 
49   See especially John Kaplan, “Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process” (1968) 20 
Stan. L. Rev. 1065; Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, “A Bayesian Approach 
to Identification Evidence” (1970) 83 Harv. L. Rev. 489; Richard O. Lempert, “Modeling 
Relevance” (1977) 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 [Lempert, “Modeling Relevance”]. 
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given that such context, while plainly relevant to empirical theorizing 
about legal proof, is also relevant to normative theorizing about how the 
evidence can be said to permit the inference of a fact, including cause-in-fact.  
 This is not to suggest that evidence theory per se supplies the answer; 
these weaknesses are also shared by the theory of evidence presupposed 
by Klar’s criticisms, which offer a probabilistic account privileging statis-
tical information for assessing the reliability of evidence.50 As I will show 
in my primary inquiry in this paper, probabilistic theory denies subtle 
characteristics of both evidence and legal fact-finding, and its statistical 
expression is of dubious reliability on its own terms. This will lead me to 
conclude by considering an emerging body of work within evidence theory 
(drawing particularly but not exclusively from the work of Ronald J. Al-
len) that emphasizes the legal fact-finding process as entailing the as-
sessment and continuing reassessment of competing versions of events. 
That process, put succinctly, is seen as resting upon the fact-finder’s “in-
ference to the best explanation.” My claim will be that, allowing for cer-
tain important corrections, such an understanding offers tort lawyers a 
generally promising normative justification for inference causation by ac-
counting for both the epistemology of legal fact-finding and the adjudica-
tive context in which it takes place. 
II. Veritism 
 I turn, then, to the first criticism of inference causation—that it does 
not conform to the law’s veritistic objectives. Inference causation, the ar-
gument goes, is a rhetorical proxy for lowering the standard of proof in 
cases where there are gaps in the evidence marshalled by the plaintiff.51 
As such, it is an instance of a more general “policyization”52 of cause-in-
fact, affording by way of the vacuous incantations of “robustness” and 
“common sense” a crutch for fact-finders who cannot point to affirmative 
evidence explaining why a plaintiff ought to recover.53 In short, it has lit-
tle to do with truth and more to do with the fact-finder’s own preferences. 
This concern draws strength from the language that Justice Sopinka used 
in Snell, which demonstrated tepid commitment to veritism at best, inso-
far as he speculated that the causal “inference” could be drawn with “very 
                                                  
50   Klar, Tort Law, supra note 34 at 447, n. 91. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
51   See text accompanying note 38. 
52   Black, “Policyization”, supra note 34 at 195. See also Salvatore Mirandola, “Lost 
Chances, Cause-in-Fact, and Rationality in Medical Negligence” (1992) 50 U.T. Fac. L. 
Rev. 258 at 260; Ernest J. Weinrib, “A Step Forward in Factual Causation” (1975) 38 
Mod. L. Rev. 518 at 532 [Weinrib, “A Step Forward”]. 
53   Snell, supra note 14 at 328.  
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little affirmative evidence on the part of the plaintiff.”54 As I have already 
noted, his references to “robust[ness]” and “common sense”55 amplify the 
sense that the truth of the matter, relative to the particular outcome that 
a fact-finder might desire, is unimportant. 
 Such minimization of veritism is troubling, as truth-seeking is an ele-
mental aspiration of our legal order. Accurate fact-finding is essential, 
particularly if we understand the rule of law as a substantive limitation 
on the state’s ability to manipulate facts to its own ends, even where that 
manipulation is for the ostensibly benevolent purpose of compensating in-
jured plaintiffs.56 Within the framework of a tort action, then, the law in-
sists on linking a finding of actual wrongdoing by the defendant to the 
plaintiff’s suffering. This linkage “supplies the particular feature about 
the defendant that singles him out from the generality of those available 
for the shifting of the plaintiff’s loss.”57 A serious account of inference cau-
sation must therefore distinguish its underlying epistemic processes from 
emotivism or any similarly non-cognitive, meta-ethical point of view such 
as the popular concept of “truthiness”,58 or the “benevolent principle” that 
Lord Nourse discerned in Fitzgerald v. Lane—a concept that “smiles on ... 
factual uncertainties and melts them all away.”59 In such a mindset, 
where “all evaluative judgments ... are nothing but expressions of prefer-
                                                  
54   Ibid. at 328. 
55   Ibid. 
56   Birks, supra note 36 at 15: 
The suggestion that judges should be free to apply whatever remedy they 
think best for the trouble in hand emanates from our taking the rule of law 
for granted. Benevolent power is in one sense more dangerous than malevo-
lent power. It undermines vigilance. We easily drop our guard. 
57   Ernest J. Weinrib, “Causation and Wrongdoing” (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 407 at 
412. 
58   “Truthiness” is a term coined in 2005 by political satirist Stephen Colbert that refers to 
“the quality of stating concepts or facts one wishes or believes to be true, rather than 
concepts or facts known to be true”: Stephen Colbert, “The Word-Truthiness”, The Col-
bert Report (17 October 2005), online: Colbert Nation <http://colbertnation.com/the-
colbert-report-videos>. See also Stephen Colbert, “Colbert Roasts Bush” (Talk presented 
at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, Washington, D.C., 29 April 2006), online: 
YouTube <http://www.youtube.com>. As Colbert put it: 
We’re not some brainiacs on the nerd patrol. We’re not members of the fact-
inista. We go straight from the gut. ... That’s where the truth lies, right down 
here in the gut. Do you know you have more nerve endings in your gut than 
you have in your head? You can look it up. Now I know some of you are going 
to say, “I did look it up, and that’s not true.” That’s because you looked it up 
in a book. Next time look it up in your gut. ... I call it the “no-fact-zone” 
[transcribed by author].  
59   [1987] 3 W.L.R. 249 at 262, [1987] 2 All E.R. 455 (C.A.). 
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ence, expressions of attitude or feeling,”60 there is no difference between 
stating that the defendant acted wrongly by causing the plaintiff’s injury 
and claiming that I like the plaintiff more than I like the defendant. 
 The question of how we link together two persons and two moments in 
time—the defendant and the moment of his or her negligence, and the 
plaintiff and the moment of his or her suffering—must therefore be an-
swered in a manner that reconciles the inferential leap with the law’s 
veritistic aims. Inference causation cannot be a matter of merely cobbling 
together narratives taken out of thin air with a view to expressing what a 
fact-finder feels; rather, it must presuppose an adjudicative procedure 
that is veritistic. I will later seek to do so with reference to what Alvin 
Goldman conceived of as the epistemological principle of “total evidence”, 
being that a fact-finder must “fix his beliefs or subjective probabilities in 
accordance with the total evidence in his possession at the time.”61 I shall 
assume that Goldman’s direction is uncontroversial because its reference 
point of “evidence” affirms a veritistic imperative. There is a difference be-
tween being involuntarily disposed to feel that the defendant’s negligence 
has caused the plaintiff’s suffering, and voluntarily accepting based upon 
the evidence that it has.62 By being tied to an evidentiary reference point, 
inference causation can be distinguished from the fudging that is said to 
permit legal fact-finders to find in favour of sympathy-inducing plaintiffs 
because it feels right.63  
 While Goldman’s “total evidence” presupposes veritism, it also pre-
supposes that a fact-finder’s belief will be decided by reference only to 
such evidence “in his possession at the time.”64 The fact-finder’s truth-
seeking obligation, then, is unavoidably conditioned upon and discharged 
in a state of incomplete evidence. What evidence is before the fact-finder 
may and often will lead not to some absolute truth, but rather to an ap-
proximation of events. Lord Wilberforce remarked in Air Canada v. Secre-
tary of State for Trade65 that adjudication often entails imperfect or even 
withheld evidence, and legal fact-finding therefore occurs without knowl-
edge of the whole truth. “[Y]et,” he continued, “if the decision has been in 
                                                  
60   Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) at 11-12 [emphasis in original]. 
61   Alvin I. Goldman, “Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Soci-
ety” (1991) 88 Journal of Philosophy 113 at 113 [Goldman, “Epistemic Paternalism”]. 
62   L. Jonathan Cohen, “Should a Jury Say What It Believes or What It Accepts?” (1991) 13 
Cardozo L. Rev. 465 at 468 [Cohen, “Should a Jury”]. 
63   Cf. Cheifetz, “Causative Snark”, supra note 8 (“The common sense method does not 
mean that the fact finder may consider [propositions] that are not in evidence” at 35). 
64   Goldman, “Epistemic Paternalism”, supra note 61 at 113. 
65   [1983] 2 A.C. 394, [1983] 2 W.L.R. 494 (H.L.) [Air Canada cited to A.C.]. 
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accordance with the available evidence and with the law, justice will have 
been fairly done.”66  
 The underlying presupposition here is that veritism is not the exclu-
sive goal of adjudication, nor would it be even if it were theoretically pos-
sible to achieve absolute truth after painstaking inquiry. What we strive 
for is justice achieved through “a process reasonably designed to ascertain 
the truth, [and] in ways consistent with ... other ends of the legal system.”67 
Indeed, Air Canada goes so far as to suggest that “[t]he principal, if not 
the only, purpose of civil litigation” is not truth-seeking, but rather “the 
resolution of disputes.”68 One can think of even more non-veritistic objec-
tives such as public confidence,69 acceptance of the rule of law, pacification 
of parties or simply removing a sense of injustice.70 Concerns for proce-
dural efficiency and thrift, or for fostering relationships such as those be-
tween solicitors and clients, between spouses, or between parties gener-
ally,71 also operate as competitors to veritism. So does the exclusion of 
evidence going to character, to subsequent remedial measures, or to at-
tempts to compromise a claim. The new emphasis in civil justice reform 
on mandatory alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the en-
shrinement of formal settlement procedures in most rules of court (com-
plete with cost incentives) is similarly indifferent to truth-seeking. More-
over, this systemic anti-veritism is perpetuated in turn by the functus 
rule, which precludes further reflection upon the evidence.72 
                                                  
66   Ibid. at 438 [emphasis added].  
67   John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999) at 210 [emphasis added]. 
68   J.A. Jolowicz, “Civil Litigation: What’s It For?” (2008) 67 Cambridge L.J. 508 at 514. 
This was echoed by Blackmun J.’s observation in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. that 
the legal system aspires to “quick, final, and binding ... judgment” (509 U.S. 579 at 597 
(1993) [Daubert]). 
69   Laurence H. Tribe, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process” 
(1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 at 1376. 
70   Patrick Devlin, The Judge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) at 3. More pluralist 
understandings of the aims of civil process have also embraced “economizing of re-
sources, inspiring confidence, supporting independent social policies, permitting ease in 
prediction and application, adding to the efficiency of the entire legal system, and tran-
quilizing disputants”: Jack B. Weinstein, “Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for De-
termining Truth in Judicial Trials” (1966) 66 Colum. L. Rev. 223 at 241. 
71   Kronman views the imperative of understanding relations between parties and “those 
who identify with or support them” as being so fundamental to adjudication that it 
speaks to the ethics of judging: Anthony T. Kronman, “Living in the Law” (1987) 54 U. 
Chicago L. Rev. 835 at 864. 
72   “The general [functus rule is] that a final decision of a court cannot be reopened”: 
Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848 at 860, 101 A.R. 321, 
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 I do not mean to suggest that some of these rules are without prob-
lems; indeed, objectives other than truth are replete with interesting phi-
losophical implications. My point here, however, is that all of these rules, 
which remove from the fact-finder’s consideration the information rele-
vant to drawing pertinent inferences, augment the likelihood of inaccu-
rate fact-finding. They demonstrate that rectitude of factual determina-
tion in civil process inevitably clashes with other objectives.73 Veritism 
simpliciter, taken as the evaluation of a factual proposition by exclusive 
reference to its conformance to absolute truth, is simply never in the cards 
in a system where truth-seeking may be constrained or outright sacrificed 
by legal desiderata, which have little, if anything, to do with truth.  
 At the same time, indifference to truth seems less troubling when it is 
employed to achieve settlement, for example, than when it governs legal 
fact-finding. The former does not implicate a norm that privileges judg-
ments that are understood by the fact-finder as being at least as correct as 
possible (allowing for the impossibility of absolute correctness given im-
perfect information). It is surely wrong, however, to associate legal fact-
finding with extreme relativism. We want not mere finality, but just final-
ity, and substantial justice requires a premium on truth. On the rare oc-
casion when veritism is expressly abandoned in adjudicating cause-in-
fact,74 one might ask: Why bother having a trial? Why hear witnesses? 
Why insist upon testimony in the language of perception and not of inter-
pretation? To conclude that none of these things matter would be to view 
the institution of the trial as an elaborate charade. While veritism sim-
pliciter is not the goal and not empirically achievable, the law nonetheless 
aspires to connect causally a defendant’s liability with a defendant’s neg-
ligent act or omission. Fact-finding thus requires truth in at least “a suffi-
cient amount”.75  
 While veritistic aims subsist in legal fact-finding, any theory of legal 
fact-finding generally, and of finding cause-in-fact in particular, must also 
account for the uncertainty contemplated by the structure of proof within 
which evidence is processed; that is, how one determines that data repre-
      
Sopinka J., majority. “It is based ... on the policy ground which favours finality of pro-
ceedings” (ibid. at 862). 
73   Lisa Dufraimont, “Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment” (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 
199 at 203-204. 
74   Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (“there should be no exculpa-
tion of a defendant who, although a member of the market producing DES for preg-
nancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff’s injury” at 1078 [emphasis 
added]). 
75   James R. Olchowy, “Battling for the Judge’s or Jury’s Imagination: Evidence, Storytel-
ling, and Effective Trial Advocacy” (2003) 16 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 1 at 2. 
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sents proof of a factual proposition.76 To return to my earlier point, the ob-
jectives of evidence law are epistemic and concern the rational reasoning 
methods by which conclusions are reached. Both reference points of “total 
evidence”77 and of the civil standard of proof influence the epistemological 
project of explaining how the cognitive inferences drawn by fact-finders 
qualify as knowledge: though legal fact-finders may seek truth from the 
evidence, the most they will find is a likelihood of truth. For juristic pur-
poses, something short of absolute knowledge—including inferential 
knowledge—must therefore still carry veritistic value. The first criticism 
is thus unconvincing: by adopting an evidentiary reference point, infer-
ence causation proves to be no less veritistic than adjudication itself. 
III.  Scientific Fact-Finding 
 I now progress to the second inquiry by examining the criticism that 
inference causation disregards a supposed need for scientific evidence 
linking the defendant’s negligence with the plaintiff’s suffering. Specifi-
cally, I advance two reasons for which scientific uncertainty cannot justly 
halt the fact-finder’s inquiry in its tracks. First, scientific fact-finding is, 
simply put, not the same thing as legal fact-finding. They are not mutual 
substitutes. Second, scientific fact-finding, which operates at a general 
statistical level, tells us only about the causal link that might or might not 
exist in general, and not whether such a link is instantiated in the par-
ticular instance of the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s suffer-
ing.78 
A. Differentiating Scientific Fact-Finding from Legal Fact-Finding 
 The first reason why the absence of scientific evidence should not de-
feat a legal finding of causation implicates the contrasting standards of 
proof and underlying epistemic processes entailed by science and law re-
spectively. While both courts79 and academics80 rightly aver the diver-
                                                  
76   Ronald J. Allen, “Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence” (1993) 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 
604 at 606 [Allen, “Factual Ambiguity”]; James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable 
Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008) at 20-21. 
77   Goldman, “Epistemic Paternalism”, supra note 61 at 113.  
78   See Hart & Honoré, supra note 31 (“In the sciences causes are often sought to explain 
not particular occurrences but types of occurrence” at 33 [emphasis in original]). 
79   Snell, supra note 14 (“Causation need not be determined by scientific precision” at 328; 
“Medical experts ordinarily determine causation in terms of certainties whereas a 
lesser standard is demanded by the law” at 330). See also Daubert, supra note 68 
(“there are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the 
quest for truth in the laboratory” at 596-97). 
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gence in standards of proof, its significance lies not in the existence of two 
thresholds but in the intervening gap. 
 The point becomes more plain when expressed mathematically.81 The 
legal burden of juridical proof is conventionally understood to be a prob-
ability measure of {>0.50}, meaning that the fact, while less than certain 
to represent absolute truth, is more likely true than not.82 The scientific 
threshold for proof, however, is substantially higher. Statistically signifi-
cant conclusions normally fall within an interval of confidence, which is 
the range within which a study parameter lies 95% of the time.83 Thus, a 
scientific expert would deny causal association between potential causes 
and effects unless the connection would not occur due to chance (or some 
other potential cause) more than 5% of the time.84 This leaves a range of 
{<0.449} between the two thresholds—the probability measure of proposi-
tions that satisfy legal fact-finders but not scientific fact-finders—within 
which the plaintiff’s case ought to succeed. To side with the defendant 
whenever a scientific fact-finder will not opine on cause-in-fact therefore 
creates a one-sided inquiry in the defendant’s favour.85 It is simply unjust 
for a legal fact-finder to maintain that a scientific fact-finder’s refusal or 
inability to discern the necessary causal linkage between risk creation 
      
80   Beever, Rediscovering, supra note 32 at 491-92; Glanville Williams, “Causation in the 
Law” [1961] Cambridge L.J. 62 at 66-69 [Williams, “Causation in the Law”]. 
81   The reducibility of burdens of proof to numerical terms appears to be widely accepted, 
although it remains controversial in some circles. See e.g. Robert J. Rhee, “Probability, 
Policy and the Problem of Reference Class” (2007) 11 Int’l J. of Evidence & Proof 286 at 
287-88; Craig R. Callen, “Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A Comment on Professor Al-
len’s Theory” (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 423 at 428 [Callen, “Kicking Rocks”]; Ronald J. 
Allen & Craig R. Callen, “The Juridical Management of Factual Uncertainty” (2003) 7 
Int’l J. of Evidence & Proof 1 at 7 [Allen & Callen, “Juridical Management”]. My pur-
pose here, however, is simply to use statistical reference points to demonstrate the gap 
between legal and scientific fact-finding thresholds. 
82   Allen, “Factual Ambiguity”, supra note 76 at 604; Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, 
“The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence” (2007) 36 J. Legal Stud. 
107 at 111 [Allen & Pardo, “Mathematical Models”]. See also Fennell v. Southern Mary-
land Hosp. Ctr., 580 A.2d 206 at 206 (Md. 1990); Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 at 
141 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1986). 
83   Richard Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts: Scientific Evidence and Me-
dicinal Product Liability (Oxford: Hart, 1999) at 105; Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence 
M. Solan, “The Uneasy Relationship between Science and Law: An Essay and Introduc-
tion” (Symposium, A Cross-Disciplinary Look at Scientific Truth: What’s the Law to Do?, 
Brooklyn Law School, 2 March 2007) (2008) 73 Brook. L. Rev. 847 at 852.  
84   Troyen A. Brennan, “Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Al-
ternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law 
Courts” (1989) 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 at 23-24 [Brennan, “Helping Courts”]; Berger & So-
lan, supra note 83 at 852.  
85   Beever, Rediscovering, supra note 32 at 471. 
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and suffering is determinative of the outcome of a tort action.86 All that 
this failure tells us is that the factual proposition is not provable to a 
probability measure of {0.95}. The juristic inquiry must continue. The 
question is how. 
 The divergence in thresholds is less revealing than the divergence in 
underlying methodologies. Since the intellectual tasks of the scientist and 
jurist are distinct inter se, they call for distinct intellectual processes. In 
science, where we know what has happened but are left with indetermi-
nate data that fail to explain why it happened, experiments are repeated 
until the event can be satisfactorily replicated. The underlying process of 
fact-finding, then, involves further refinement of the deductive structure 
of extant knowledge by eliminating anomalies whether empirical or theo-
retical, thereby modifying or even replacing the overall conceptual struc-
ture of that kind of event. In this way, the scientific process seeks to sim-
plify phenomena, usually by controlling as many variables as possible. 
Until that occurs, determinations of a causal link between risk augmenta-
tion and suffering must always remain provisional:87 counterexamples, or 
the possibility of confounding factors, can never be ruled out.88  
 Legal fact-finders, by contrast, do not replicate events to determine 
why something happened. Instead, parties offer up various, and typically 
inconsistent versions of events, all of which are assessed in drawing a 
conclusion about the event.89 In part, this difference in process exists be-
cause of the practical imperatives in the law that preclude waiting for cer-
tainty;90 whereas science is ongoing, law needs finality, and so the fact-
finding inquiry must stop at some point.91 More fundamentally, there are 
                                                  
86   “[T]he law prefers a 50 per cent[] chance of doing justice to the certainty of doing injus-
tice”: Weinrib, “A Step Forward”, supra note 52 at 524, citing Glanville L. Williams, 
Case Comment on Cook v. Lewis, (1953) 31 Can. Bar Rev. 315 at 317. This is also the 
law on criminal causation. See R. v. Smithers, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 321 
(“The weight to be given to the evidence of the experts was entirely for the jury. In the 
search for truth, the jury was entitled to consider all of the evidence, expert and lay, 
and accept or reject any part of it” S.C.R. at 518).  
87    Chris Miller, “Causation in Personal Injury: Legal or Epidemiological Common Sense?” 
(2006) 26 L.S. 544 at 547. 
88    See Berger & Solan, supra note 83 at 851-52. 
89    See generally Allen, “Factual Ambiguity”, supra note 76. 
90    Miller, supra note 87 at 547. 
91    Alex Stein, “The Refoundation of Evidence Law” (1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Jur. 279 at 286 
[Stein, “Refoundation”]. Indeed, further investigation may be futile; the notion that 
there may be “[c]ompleteness of evidence” is only a “scientific ideal” (Dufraimont, supra 
note 73 at 206). Because factual uncertainty derives from gaps in evidence instead of 
known-but-unavailable evidence, nobody can predict the fact that would be proven by 
the “missing” evidence, were it available. Causal determinations, then, entail underly-
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simply too many variables in legal fact-finding to be accounted for, includ-
ing factors for which scientific deduction cannot account. Trial phenom-
ena, such as lawyers’ and witnesses’ conduct, demeanour, emotive quali-
ties, and personal idiosyncrasies fit uneasily into scientific fact-finding be-
cause homing in on their meaning involves complex mental activities that 
have their own peculiar logic and pattern.92 These phenomena instantiate 
“soft variables”, which are resistant to ready quantification. Nearly forty 
years ago, Laurence Tribe saw them as undermining scientific claims to 
normatively superior fact-finding properties.93 Confronted with the neces-
sity of reaching just verdicts with such uncertain evidence, legal fact-
finders reason inductively.  
 For scientific fact-finding to be substitutional for legal fact-finding, it 
would have to be able to make deductive sense of soft variables, with the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for drawing a conclusion set out in ad-
vance. For example, if the expert witness smiles at her interrogator more 
at one end of the mouth than the other, twitches her eyebrows, and averts 
her gaze, she lacks confidence in her answer. This deduction is of course 
impossible, because the cognitive rules by which soft variables are proc-
essed defy definitive articulation.94 What I am suggesting here is that le-
gal fact-finding’s inductive structure is a necessary instantiation of the 
more general observation of Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putman:  
[M]ental states are not only compositionally plastic but also computa-
tionally plastic, that is, [there are] reasons to believe that physically 
possible creatures ... have an indefinite number of different ‘pro-
grams’, and that the hypothesis that there are necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for the presence of such a belief in computational, or 
computational-cum-physical, terms is unrealistic in just the way 
[that] the theory that there is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the presence of a table stateable in phenomenalist terms is unrealis-
tic: such a condition would be infinitely long, and not constructed ac-
cording to any effective rule.95 
      
ing reasoning that would have to account for unrealized and unknowable forensic pos-
sibilities. See Alex Stein, “An Essay on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litiga-
tion, with Special Reference to Contract Cases” (1998) 48 U.T.L.J. 299 at 300 [Stein, 
“Uncertainty”]. 
92    Tillers, supra note 47 at 921; MacCrimmon, “Common Sense”, supra note 1 at 1436. See 
also Faryna v. Chorny (1951), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354, 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 171 (B.C.C.A.). 
93    Tribe, supra note 69 at 1361, 1393. 
94    Allen, “Factual Ambiguity”, supra note 76 at 626-27.  
95    Martha C. Nussbaum & Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s Mind” in Martha C. 
Nussbaum & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, eds., Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) 27 at 48 [emphasis added]. 
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Therefore, the most that we can say is that such information, when put 
before a fact-finder, may or may not influence the outcome drawn. It de-
pends on “the sum total of [the fact-finder’s] experiences at the moment of 
decision,”96 which would, by that time, include counsel’s submissions on 
the meaning of such information and all other observations generated 
during the trial. 
 In an illuminating psychological study of the cognitive processes of le-
gal fact-finding where jurors are employed, experimental psychologists 
Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie empirically demonstrated these cogni-
tive processes at work.97 The juror, they conclude, is a “sense-making in-
formation processor” who, confronted with evidentiary uncertainty includ-
ing soft variables, “strives to create a meaningful summary of the evi-
dence available that explains what happened.”98 This meaningful sum-
mary is achieved by imposing a “narrative story form” upon the evidence, 
informed by the evidence itself,99 knowledge about events “similar in con-
tent” to the case under consideration, and “generic expectations about 
what makes a complete story.”100 In short, explanations of events take the 
form of stories constructed from “deductive and inductive reasoning pro-
cedures applied to the evidence and world knowledge,” including infer-
ences about “events, and causal relations between them.”101 Where there 
is factual uncertainty, individuals attempt to make sense of the available 
evidence by composing the most compelling plausible explanation possi-
ble. 
 The understanding of legal fact-finding as entailing the composition of 
a narrative is hardly new.102 In fact, it is consistent with the advice that 
                                                  
96    Allen, “Factual Ambiguity”, supra note 76 at 627. 
97    Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, “A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The 
Story Model” (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519 [Pennington & Hastie, “Cognitive Theory”]. 
See also Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod & Nancy Pennington, Inside the Jury (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, “The 
O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’ Reflections on The People of the State of 
California v. Orenthal James Simpson” (1996) 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 957. Causal cognition 
is in fact a substantial topic in psychological research, although Pennington and 
Hastie’s work represents a rare instance of empirical insight. Even neuroscience has 
not shed insights. See David Danks, “The Psychology of Causal Perception and Reason-
ing” in Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies, eds., Oxford Handbook 
of Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
98   Pennington & Hastie, “Cognitive Theory”, supra note 97 at 519. 
99   Ibid. at 522 (“case-specific information acquired during the trial”). 
100  Ibid. 
101  Ibid. at 524. 
102  See Hart & Honoré, supra note 31 at 28-30; Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) [Burns, Theory]; Richard Lempert, “Tell-
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senior trial counsel impart to junior counsel as to the most effective way of 
presenting a case,103 and has led to theoretical reconceptualizations of the 
trial.104 Nonetheless, these findings—which, after twenty-five years, have 
yet to be challenged—are fundamentally disconcerting to some. If “stories” 
are dependent, even partly, on a fact-finder’s life experience, then differ-
ent fact-finders may presumably derive different (and inconsistent) ac-
counts from identical facts. Further, while it might be tempting to consign 
this problem to the specific case of civil juries, which are still commonly 
employed in Canada,105 the implications of such cognitive processes in 
“judge-alone” cases are actually more troubling. Jurors must persuade 
and be persuaded by one another, while a judge need only persuade him- 
or herself. Disconcerting as this may be, however, the point remains from 
Pennington and Hastie’s work that this process is an empirically demon-
strated phenomenon.  
B. The Generality of Scientific Fact-Finding and the Specificity of Legal 
Fact-Finding 
 The danger of completely subsuming legal fact-finding into scientific 
fact-finding is also obvious when one considers that scientific method em-
phasizes the indispensability of statistical explanations.106 That is, it at-
tempts to derive statistically significant correlations or associations be-
tween outcomes and exposures to variables, such as risk augmentation. 
This ostensibly formal methodology may be intuitively appealing to legal 
fact-finders, who must otherwise rely on indeterminate and therefore fal-
lible human intuition and intelligence to reconstruct a past that may or 
may not have occurred as they have determined.107 It has, as Tribe ob-
served, the “lure of objectivity and precision.”108 This allure, however, is 
      
ing Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model” (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 559; 
Linda R. Hirshman, “It Will Be Pleasanter to Tell You a Story” (1991) 13 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 445. 
103  MacCrimmon, “Law of Evidence”, supra note 1 at 345. 
104  Burns, Theory, supra note 102; Olchowy, supra note 75. 
105  Civil juries are particularly common in British Columbia, perhaps due to the frequent 
resort to juries by British Columbia’s public motor vehicle insurer. See The Honourable 
John C. Bouck, “Civil Jury Trials—Assessing Non-Pecuniary Damages—Civil Jury Re-
form” (2002) 81 Can. Bar Rev. 493 at 513.  
106  Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, “Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of 
Cancer and Other Environmental Disease in Individuals” (1985) 10 J. Health Pol. 33 at 
38-39. 
107  However, legal fact-finders typically do not accept statistical analysis as determinative 
of anything. See Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1050-51.  
108  Tribe, supra note 69 at 1331. 
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false because mathematical probability is rarely absolutely certain.109 
Consider Jonathan Cohen’s celebrated “gatecrasher paradox”: where 501 
out of 1000 spectators gatecrashed their way into a rodeo, a purely statis-
tical analysis would lead to the absurd injustice of the impresario being 
able to recover admission fees from all 1000 spectators, based solely on 
the probability {>0.50} that every one of them was a gatecrasher.110 Even 
if we were to increase the number of gatecrashers to within the scientific 
fact-finding threshold—say, 951 out of 1000—the impresario’s claim 
would still seem absurd. 
 False mathematical certainty aside, the imposition of a purely statisti-
cal methodology upon legal fact-finding also carries both normative and 
practical difficulties.111 The normative problem lies in the detraction from 
individualized justice represented by a statistical approach. As Glanville 
Williams observed, “the scientist is concerned with causal generalisations. 
But in historical and legal statements this notion of generalisation and 
reproducibility hardly figures at all.”112 This is because statistics tell us 
only about the frequency of increased risk translating into suffering, while 
the attribution of individual suffering to the risk creator is always inde-
terminate.113 The law’s veritistic aims, however, presuppose a normative 
ideal that adjudication involves attempting to find what happened during 
specific, unique events.114 Given this ideal, legal fact-finders seek to pro-
nounce individualized judgments about whether the risk creator actually 
caused the suffering.115 And so, they investigate particular phenomena 
“[a]rmed with ... knowledge of general physical laws and other data such 
as eyewitness testimony of behaviour,”116 and then “apply [their] data (in-
cluding [their] knowledge of general physical laws) to an investigation of a 
                                                  
109  Randolph N. Jonakait, “Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts” (1991) 13 
Cardozo L. Rev. 343 at 350. 
110  L. Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) at 
74-75. 
111  Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 (“‘Probabilistic causation’ is philosophically and 
pragmatically insupportable” at 1003).  
112  Williams, “Causation in the Law”, supra note 80 at 66.  
113  Brennan, “Helping Courts”, supra note 84 at 24; Khoury, supra note 27 at 49-50. 
114  See Richard W. Wright, “Causation in Tort Law” (1985) 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735 at 1822-23 
[Wright, “Causation”]. 
115  Rabbi Paul Bergman & Reverand Al Moore, “Mistrial by Likelihood Ratio: Bayesian 
Analysis Meets the F-Word” (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 589 at 591. 
116  Jane Stapleton, “Choosing What We Mean by ‘Causation’ in the Law” (2008) 73 Mo. L. 
Rev. 433 at 435. 
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particular completely specified phenomenon occurring on a specific occa-
sion.”117  
 The problem is even more fundamental for juristic purposes. Statisti-
cal evidence suffers from an inherent flaw that demands caution even 
when it is employed solely as a basis for estimating general frequencies.118 
Consider that the event in question can be modelled in an infinite number 
of ways, and that each privileges certain characteristics that will generate 
a particular probability. The dependency of the resulting probability on 
the class from which it is drawn generates an epistemological problem: 
different classes will yield different probabilities. Furthermore, there is no 
a priori method for determining whether any particular class is relatively 
closer or further from the objective truth.119 Considering Cohen’s gate-
crasher paradox, we can create subsets of rodeo attendees by, for example, 
distinguishing church-goers from atheists (on the assumption that the 
former are more likely to be honest about paying admission); or wealthy 
from poor (on the assumption that the former have no incentive to gate-
crash); or old from young (on the assumption that the former have more 
respect for the law). In short, it is not enough to know how many atten-
dees there are in order to formulate generalized causal probabilities. We 
need to know the circumstances that are relevant to the statistical prob-
ability of someone bilking the impresario. 
 This problem, which is typically conceptualized as one of “reference 
classes”,120 is implicated in factual causation. In a case like Snell, science 
could generate some conditional probabilities, such as the chance of going 
blind without the defendant’s negligence, contrasted with the chance of 
going blind with the defendant’s negligence. From that, science could ul-
timately generate an equation showing the probability that the blindness 
was caused by the defendant’s negligence. I have already observed that, 
being a mere probability, this evidence is unhelpful in determining indi-
                                                  
117  Ibid. at 438. 
118  Vern R. Walker, “Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the Possible Sources of Error in 
Inferences” in Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., The Dynamics of Judicial 
Proof: Computation, Logic, and Common Sense (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2002) 197 
(“Statistical associations among sampling data may warrant a conclusion or finding 
about generic causation, but that conclusion has an inherent risk of causal error” at 
223). 
119  See Michael S. Pardo, “Reference Classes and Legal Evidence” (2007) 11 Int’l J. of Evi-
dence & Proof 255 at 256; Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1047. 
120  John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London, U.K.: Macmillan, 1921) at 
94; David Papineau, For Science in the Social Sciences (London, U.K.: Macmillan, 1978) 
c. 3 at 50ff.; Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1046-47; Paul Roberts, “From 
Theory into Practice: Introducing the Reference Class Problem” (2007) 11 Int’l J. of Evi-
dence & Proof 243. 
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vidualized causation.121 My point here, however, is that the probability, as 
a probability, is of questionable value unless we know much more about 
the reference class from which it is derived. The reference class can be 
gerrymandered in an infinite number of ways. It could be as narrow as 
someone of the gender, age, and identical medical history as the plaintiff 
in Snell, as broad as all patients whose case histories are canvassed in the 
scientific literature, or somewhere in between—perhaps the expert’s own 
patients, or subsets comprising female patients or female patients with 
particular pre-existing conditions.  
 The relevance, or probative value, of statistical evidence thus depends 
upon the selected group of persons, or reference class, as the overall popu-
lation from which probabilities are extracted, and in respect of which fac-
tual generalizations are made. The problem is not just that some refer-
ence classes will lead to the probabilistic conclusion that negligence 
caused suffering while other reference classes will not permit that conclu-
sion in statistical terms. It is also that the value of probability assess-
ments varies with the chosen reference class: the less specific the refer-
ence class is to the question at hand, the less reliable the derived probabil-
ity assessments are.122 The ostensibly objective and methodically rigorous 
quality of probability assessments is therefore illusory. 
 Moreover, the reference class problem is not merely a question of ob-
structing attempts to find a “true” cause of an event. Because the refer-
ence class is the basis on which correlation is attributed to causality, an 
overly broad reference class will lead to false causality.123 This is particu-
larly germane to epidemiology, which is based not upon experimentation, 
but upon “statistical causation”, denoting correlations between risk expo-
sures and outcomes.124 To consider a simple example, suppose we wish to 
determine whether the cause-in-fact of a plaintiff’s exposure to a particu-
lar disease lies with her choice of residence between Edmonton and Cal-
gary. And suppose that, thanks to researchers who recently considered 
this question by examining one hundred residents of Edmonton and one 
                                                  
121  See text accompanying note 106-10. 
122  For this reason, Wright (“Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1047) cites the work of Pap-
ineau (supra note 120). 
123  I am grateful to Duane Szafron for our discussion of this point. For a recent and rare 
example of a trial court discerning a reference class problem in the opinion evidence of a 
scientific expert, see Duncalf v. Capital Health Authority, 2009 ABQB 80, 4 Alta. L.R. 
(5th) 201 at para. 96, 64 C.C.L.T. (3d) 237. 
124  Brennan, “Helping Courts”, supra note 84 at 23; Brennan & Carter, supra note 106 at 
44. On statistical causation generally, see Margaret A. Berger, “Eliminating General 
Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts” (1997) 97 Colum. 
L. Rev. 2117 at 2125-26; Steve Gold, “Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Stan-
dards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence” (1986) 96 Yale L.J. 376 at 384. 
                                          THE POSSIBILITY OF “INFERENCE CAUSATION”  
 
 
27 
hundred residents of Calgary, we now have access to generalized data. 
Assume the data show that fifty of the Calgarians and twenty of the Ed-
montonians share a propensity to the disease. Without refining their ref-
erence class of city of residence, we might conclude that living in Calgary 
increases the propensity to that disease by a factor of two or greater. Be-
cause, however, the researchers found their Edmontonians living in the 
suburbs and their Calgarians living downtown, their chosen reference 
class has led us into false causality. That is, were we simply to take the 
figures as given, we would be wrongly connecting propensity to disease 
with city of residence, instead of urban living (or other potentially influen-
tial reference points such as ethnicity, health, or economic status). The 
reference class problem thus poses the risk that we might misidentify the 
cause by failing to distinguish a genuine causal influence from a spurious 
covariation.125 
 In addition to the normative objection for detracting from individual-
ized justice, there are lingering pragmatic concerns over relying upon sta-
tistical probabilities for the purposes of legal fact-finding. One practical 
reason for eschewing statistical analysis of cause-in-fact lies in the com-
plex nature of trial evidence, of which discrete bits accumulate and inter-
sect with one another, forcing fact-finders to perform continual adjust-
ments of their perceptions both of the parties’ dispute, and of particular 
evidence in light of new discoveries. Most probabilistic attempts to answer 
the objection about accounting for the complexities of accumulating evi-
dence have relied upon Bayesian decision theory.126 In essence, Bayes’s 
                                                  
125  I should concede that the reference class problem is not unique to expressly probabilis-
tic or other formal mathematical expressions of evidence. All evidence is inherently 
probabilistic (United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460 at 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)), be-
cause any factual generalization necessarily implies a reference class. The reference 
class problem is therefore an unavoidable concomitant of inference causation to at least 
some degree. The problem runs deeper, however, where naked statistical evidence is 
used in isolation from one’s own reasoning. Unlike other forms of evidence (whether in 
documentary, testimony, or physical form), any interpretation drawn from statistical 
evidence is entirely dependent upon the reference class. This is only making explicit a 
pervasive and inherent feature of scientific fact-finding in cases of forensic uncertainty: 
“quantitative theories, such as statistical approaches, all require knowledge of the in-
terdependencies of data” (Allen, “Factual Ambiguity”, supra note 76 at 620). That is, 
elements of statistical evidence are mutually dependent in a way that must be dis-
cerned before any reliable interpretation can be derived.  
126  Kaplan, supra note 49; Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 49; Lempert, “Modeling Rele-
vance”, supra note 49; Richard D. Friedman, “Route Analysis of Credibility and Hear-
say” (1987) 96 Yale L.J. 667; Peter Tillers & David Schum, “Hearsay Logic” (1992) 76 
Minn. L. Rev. 813; Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, “Juror Understanding of DNA 
Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a 
Relatively Small Random-Match Probability” (2005) 34 J. Legal Stud. 395. 
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theory furnishes a mechanism for incrementally revising probability es-
timates in light of new information, thereby allowing a fact-finder to up-
date continually an opinion about the relative likelihood of a fact. This re-
quires two pieces of data, the first being an a priori estimate of the prob-
ability that a fact is proven or not. Bayesians posit that a fact-finder be-
gins with an original estimate of the likelihood of a fact, such as a causal 
link. That prior probability is then continually revised to reflect the statis-
tical impact of new, relevant information as it is received and incorpo-
rated into the probabilistic calculation of the likelihood of the fact. In 
Bayesian terms, the statistical impact of new information constitutes the 
second piece of data, being a likelihood ratio, which is multiplied by the 
prior probability to create the posterior possibility. The process is re-
peated until finally, the fact-finder supposedly arrives at the final modifi-
cation of the probability of the causal linkage.127 The claim for Bayesian 
methodology and for its superiority over “intuitive” fact-finding was neatly 
summarized by Michael Saks and Jonathan Koehler: 
The Bayesian approach can have a clarifying effect on one’s thinking 
about evidence. By using Bayes’ Theorem, we can see what informa-
tion about the evidence is needed, where the absence of data is re-
placed by assumptions of the witnesses or fact findings, and, ulti-
mately, what impact the evidence should have on our preexisting be-
liefs. In contrast, the intuitive decision-maker has few helpful guide-
posts for updating beliefs, and risks falling victim to some of the 
many biases associated with the heuristic strategies intuitive deci-
sion-makers employ.128 
 Bayesian methodology suffers from several defects, however, making 
it incompatible with legal fact-finding.129 The principal objection chal-
lenges prior probability: it is in essence a reference class, since it forms 
the a priori basis from which the probability of a proposition such as a 
      
   I do not propose here to describe the mathematical underpinnings of Bayesianism, 
preferring to leave them to the more technically competent; I wish instead to focus on 
whether Bayes’s theorem furnishes an adequate model for legal fact-finding. For the 
mathematical underpinnings, see generally Tribe, supra note 69 at 1351-52; Michael J. 
Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, “What DNA ‘Fingerprinting’ Can Teach the Law About 
the Rest of Forensic Science” (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 361 at 364, n. 17. See especially 
Judea Pearl, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible In-
ference, 2d ed. (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, 1988) c. 2 at 29ff. 
127  Tribe, supra note 69 at 1350. See also Saks & Koehler, supra note 126 at 364. 
128  Ibid. at 364-65. See also Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, “Veridical Verdicts: 
Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and 
Methods” (1990) 75 Cornell L. Rev. 247 at 274-75. 
129  Bayesian analysis was first attacked by Tribe (supra note 69). Tribe did not, however, 
challenge the Bayesian epistemological claim to describe the structure of rational think-
ing about inference, but rather focused on what he saw as Bayesianism’s pragmatic, 
moral, and social implications. 
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causal link is made. Everything that follows—the continual updates of the 
prior estimate in light of discovered bits of evidence relevant to cause-in-
fact, and the final modification of the assessment of the proposition’s like-
lihood—depends upon that starting point. Unless, however, that pre-
existing probability is truly a priori—that is, an analytic proposition that 
derives from logic and reason,130 as opposed to a synthetic proposition 
based on experience and observations131—there is no reason to accept that 
pre-existing probability’s status within Bayesian methodology is inher-
ently reliable. And, without that reliable starting point, the posterior or 
ultimate probability that is the subject of later calculation and recalcula-
tion is unreliable. In other words, the new statistical probability is just as 
suspect as the prior.132 Its relevance is determined only with reference to 
an initial hypothesis, formulated without the sophisticated probabilistic 
thinking that is ostensibly brought to bear upon later aggregations. Given 
the scientific fact-finder’s claim to formal objectivity, the Bayesian process 
is ironically totally dependent upon the intuition that probabilists eschew 
as fuzzy and unreliable, and which statistical evidence ostensibly allows 
fact-finders to avoid.  
 Another objection to statistical evidence and to its processing in litiga-
tion in a Bayesian manner derives from the empirical limitations of hu-
man computational capacity. The notion of a fact-finder who continually 
and mathematically refines accumulating data is simply implausible. The 
nature of evidence itself, moreover, defies easy Bayesian statistical reduc-
tion. Take again the problem of soft variables in evidence. Bayesian 
analysis cannot account for the significance to be ascribed to the meaning 
of a witness’s smile in describing a possible causal sequence because both 
the factual question of whether it was more a smirk than a smile, and the 
contrasting hypotheses (derision or humour) pose difficulties and perhaps 
impossibilities for statistical reduction. In other words, probabilistic 
analysis of evidence, including evidence of cause-in-fact, is futile because 
evidence does not speak for itself by stating its own probative qualities or 
                                                  
130  Examples of such logical analytic propositions are: one plus one equals two; only women 
can give birth; and the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. It is admittedly possi-
ble, in statistical terms, to have such a proposition where the reference class is objec-
tively determinable and exhaustive, but it only seems imaginable in an experimental 
setting, free of competing versions of historical events. Bergman and Moore give the ex-
ample of a sack of 100 marbles, 50 of which are red. As a matter of logic and reason, 
there is a prior probability of {0.50} that the first marble removed from the sack will be 
red (Bergman & Moore, supra note 115 at 597). 
131  Examples of such synthetic propositions are: Norway is colder than Greece; London is 
larger than Vancouver; and all owls hunt at night. 
132  See Tribe, supra note 69 at 1350. 
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weight.133 As Keynes explained, “weight ... measures the sum of the fa-
vourable and unfavourable evidence, [while] probability measures the dif-
ference.”134  
IV.  The Inferential Quality of Legal Fact-Finding 
A. Infusing Evidence Theory into Causal Inference 
 Evidence, then, acquires legal meaning only through the complex cog-
nitive processes that fact-finders bring to bear upon it. Benjamin Cardozo 
(writing extrajudicially) observed, “We may try to see things as objectively 
as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except 
our own.”135 This is particularly so for statistical evidence, which requires 
first “transforming it from evidence about the generality of cases to evi-
dence about the particular case before us.”136 Statistics alone prove noth-
ing, because “[n]o datum or object has an inferential value standing 
alone.”137 They are, in short, just something else to be interpreted;138 their 
probative value will depend on the strength that they lend to a particular 
inference at trial.139 This is the upshot of the problem Wright averred 
                                                  
133  Ronald J. Allen, “On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clari-
fication of the ‘Naked Statistical Evidence’ Debate, The Meaning of ‘Evidence,’ and the 
Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” (1991) 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1093 at 1103 
[Allen, “Batting Averages”]. 
134  Keynes, supra note 120 at 77 [emphasis in original]. This explains why, even where the 
probability might increase as a plaintiff accumulates supportive evidence, a legal fact-
finder can still reject evidence: the truth of the underlying proposition might still be un-
reliable despite its probabilistic superiority over the competing proposition.  
135  Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 2005) 
at 9. 
136  Tribe, supra note 69 at 1346 [emphasis in original]. 
137  Craig R. Callen, “Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of ‘Sufficiency of the Evidence’ 
Tests” (1991) 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1113 at 1129.  
138  Allen & Pardo, “Mathematical Models”, supra note 82 at 135-36. 
139  Indeed, it is not obvious that statistics ought to be considered by legal fact-finders at all, 
let alone in isolation from other evidence. The disparity to which I have already referred 
(between probability theory and human reasoning when confronted with uncertainty) 
suggests that they ought to be excluded altogether, and there is support for this argu-
ment. See Callen, “Kicking Rocks”, supra note 81; Tribe, supra note 69 at 1350, 1365. 
There is also support for the inclusion of statistics within a pluralist understanding of 
what qualifies as evidence. See Allen & Pardo, “Mathematical Models”, supra note 82 at 
136-37; Roberts, supra note 120 at 251-52; Stein, “Uncertainty”, supra note 91 at 301; 
Tillers, supra note 47 at 888-89. Pardo also seems to have taken Robert Rhee as having 
argued for exclusion (Pardo, supra note 119 at 257); however, Rhee has expressly stated 
that statistics are not a question of “exclusion, but rather one of appropriate weight” 
(Rhee, supra note 81 at 291). I do not attempt to resolve this dispute in this paper. My 
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when he wrote that probabilities provide, at most, evidence supporting the 
applicability of different causal generalizations, but “do not in themselves 
indicate which of the possibly applicable causal generalizations actually 
applies to the particular concrete occurrence.”140 
 My argument here is that evidence submitted at trial—particularly 
circumstantial evidence of correlation, such as the temporal proximity be-
tween surgery and blindness—is, on its own, underdeterminative of the 
true significance that legal fact-finders may (or may not) ascribe to as-
pects of the historical event that is the subject matter of the lawsuit.141 
Such ascription is accomplished by an inferential process in which docu-
ments, testimony, and physical exhibits become evidence through argu-
ments that interpret them with relation to that event.142 This goes to a 
more fundamental point, also anticipated by Wright: particularizing 
cause-in-fact—that is, determining what happened on a particular occa-
sion—requires us to infer that a “causal generalization and its underlying 
causal law have been fully instantiated on the particular occasion.”143 In 
other words, inference is a ubiquitous and immanent part of causal de-
termination. Fact-finders always find facts by choosing whether or not to 
infer. We infer (or do not infer) from the fact that the morning newspaper 
reports that the Toronto Maple Leafs lost last night’s hockey game that 
they did; we infer (or do not infer) from the fact that history books repre-
sent that Horatio Nelson died in victory at the Battle of Trafalgar that he 
did. Indeed, present knowledge of “historical past” is a construction com-
posed of “what the evidence obliges us to believe.”144 Historical fact, then, 
is not a question of “what was” or “what really happened”, but rather 
what the historian infers to have happened.145 Tort claims requiring legal 
fact-finders to fill gaps in order to construct a historical account of cause-
in-fact entail the same inferential process.146  
      
point is to defend inference causation, which is supported by both sides of the issue of 
whether the evidence that scientists can offer in the face of factual uncertainty ought to 
be considered. 
140  Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1047 [footnote omitted]. 
141  Ibid. 
142  Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, “Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Ac-
tionable” (1997) 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 at 1891, 1900. 
143  Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1049. 
144  Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1933) at 102-12. 
145  Ibid. 
146  This is conceded even by Klar, who goes further than I do in describing the legal fact-
finder’s options: Klar, Tort Law, supra note 34 (“The court must guess at what would 
have occurred, using its best judgment, intuition, common sense, experiences, expert 
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 Consider a plaintiff who, at the material time, suffered from type I os-
teogenesis imperfecta, or brittle bone disease, meaning that his bones 
break easily in the course of ordinary daily activities. He does not experi-
ence symptoms of having a broken arm until after he is hit by a negli-
gently operated automobile while crossing a marked crosswalk. A subse-
quent X-ray reveals that he has suffered a broken arm. No one would se-
riously suggest that a scientific expert is required in this case to demon-
strate cause-in-fact, nor would anyone seriously challenge a legal fact-
finder’s conclusion that the driver’s negligence was the cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiff’s broken arm. The factual causal link is nonetheless being in-
ferred, not “demonstrated”. Evidential sources—in this case, the plaintiff’s 
evidence as to his medical condition—do not speak for themselves by 
demonstrating the mechanical coincidence of negligence and suffering; 
their significance is inherently ambiguous.147 That ambiguity is resolved, 
either to the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s benefit, by the drawing of an in-
ference. 
 Recall Klar’s criticism of inference causation, and in particular its as-
sumption that scientific evidence is inherently reliable, or at least more 
reliable than an inference drawn in the absence of scientific evidence.148 
For that criticism to be evaluated, it is first necessary to know what is 
meant by scientific evidence. On that point we are given a hint in his ac-
companying critique of Scott (Crick) v. Mohan,149 a decision of the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench. We are told, “despite the fact that no statistical 
studies could provide a clear link to the causation issue,” an inference of 
cause-in-fact was drawn.150 It appears, then, that this critique of inference 
causation presupposes that naked statistics, on their own, constitute evi-
dence. As I have shown, however, the idea of naked statistical evidence is 
nonsensical in a juristic context because it presupposes an epistemological 
perspective that does not conform to the epistemology that is characteris-
tic of legal fact-finding. What probabilists skip is the linkage between 
propositions derived from observations of phenomena, and the implica-
tions of these propositions allowing us to draw conclusions about legal li-
ability. 
      
evidence, and whatever else may be of assistance” at 432 [emphasis added]). The text 
does not attempt to reconcile this statement with his rejection of inference causation in 
the absence of scientific evidence (see text accompanying notes 38-40). 
147  Ronald J. Allen, “The Nature of Juridical Proof” (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 373 at 395 
[Allen, “Nature of Juridical Proof”]. 
148  Klar, Tort Law, supra note 34 at 447, n. 91. 
149  (1993), 142 A.R. 281, 41 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1148 (Q.B.). 
150  Klar, Tort Law, supra note 34 at 447, n. 91 [emphasis added]. 
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 Criticisms of inference causation151 are therefore based upon an im-
poverished understanding of the nature of evidence. No account of infer-
ence causation can satisfactorily theorize precisely how the linkages be-
tween evidence of risk augmentation and factual conclusion are to be 
made and justified, because evidence itself is “theory laden”.152 As such, it 
can be interpreted in different ways, instantiating what Peter Tillers calls 
the “nomological structures” of evidence whereby a party’s theory of the 
evidence becomes part of the totality of the evidence itself.153 Evidence of 
causation—that is, Goldman’s “total evidence”154—might therefore be use-
fully distinguished from an evidential source.155 The former is an amplifi-
cation of the latter (as opposed to a reiteration), which, on its own, carries 
no weight. Evidence of causation simply exists; it is left to the fact-finder 
to ascribe significance to the evidential source, which in turn becomes 
part of the evidence. Just how that is done—how weight is ascribed to 
evidential sources—is complex, and further complicated by trial condi-
tions.156 The cogency of that ascription is the nub of the problem that crit-
ics discern in inference causation: because it is non-demonstrable and in-
ductively uncertain, its acceptance depends on a theory of evidence that 
affords a fact-finder the discretion of saying that she has sufficient or in-
sufficient reasons for making an inference from evidential sources. I will 
conclude this paper by referring to such a theory, but my point here is 
that such criticisms are futile, considering inference causation’s imma-
nence within legal fact-finding and its complexity that defies mathemati-
cal reduction. 
 An argument that might be raised in objection to all this is that my 
example of the brittle-boned plaintiff is an obvious case where scientific 
evidence is unnecessary. Such obviousness is presumably derived from 
the observable mechanical linkages: a hitherto asymptomatic plaintiff is 
struck by an automobile, he experiences symptoms of a broken arm, and 
is shortly thereafter diagnosed with a broken arm. Being able to relate his 
broken arm to a mechanism such as being struck by an automobile is un-
doubtedly more comforting to a legal fact-finder determining cause-in-
fact, since “knowledge of a mechanism usually implies knowledge of when 
                                                  
151  See text accompanying note 38-40. 
152  Robert P. Burns, “Some Realism (and Idealism) About the Trial” (1997) 31 Ga. L. Rev. 
715 at 757 [Burns, “Some Realism”]. 
153  Tillers, supra note 47 (“theory is built into all evidence—that nomological structures are 
part of the fabric of evidence” at 891). 
154  See text accompanying notes 61-64. 
155  See Stein, “Refoundation”, supra note 91 at 287, 308. 
156  Ibid. at 308-309. 
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it is or is not likely to be active.”157 Conversely, knowledge of a correlation 
does not typically imply knowledge of when risk is or is not likely to mate-
rialize into suffering. The case of the brittle-boned plaintiff is, however, 
not a case solved by mechanical knowledge because we do not know 
whether the broken arm was caused by the mechanism of {automobile + 
plaintiff} or by the pre-existing risk. Given the plaintiff’s contrasting pre– 
and post–accident symptoms, however, we might infer correlation be-
tween the defendant’s negligent driving and the plaintiff’s suffering. In-
deed, that is all we can ever do since we can never know with certainty 
whether the mechanisms by which a risk could materialize into suffering 
were instantiated in a given case. 
 Given the ubiquity and immanence of inference causation in legal fact-
finding, there is no obvious demarcation between so-called obvious cases 
where one can safely infer a causal link between risk augmentation and 
suffering, and cases requiring scientific evidence.158 The point is that fact-
finding, including fact-finding for determining cause-in-fact, always in-
volves evidentiary gaps that are filled by ascriptions of meaning to evi-
dential sources. Ex hypothesi, causal determinations can be conditioned 
upon any evidential sources containing any amount of information. Since 
the fact-finder does not know what evidence is not before him or her,159 
“[a]n argument that relevant allegations are more probable than not may 
be constructed upon virtually any amount of evidence”160 by bringing to 
bear upon it those qualities that Cardozo identified as “a stream of ten-
dency ... [giving] coherence and direction to thought ... [and comprising] 
inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, [and] acquired convictions.”161 
 While this carries an obvious risk of reaching a factually incorrect con-
clusion, that risk diminishes where, as Wright has described it, “some 
credible causal generalization links conditions of that type to results of 
that type.”162 As such, a legal fact-finder is persuaded that an incompletely 
known causal law was probably fully instantiated on a particular occa-
sion. The question on which I conclude this paper addresses whether and 
how we can give structure to that linkage generated by the causal gener-
alization—that is, to the fact-finder’s reasoning process—such that the 
evidential sources and concomitant information can be assessed in rela-
                                                  
157  Danks, supra note 97 at 19. See also Hart & Honoré, supra note 31 at 28-30 (discussion 
of “Cause and Effect”). 
158  I am grateful to Lewis Klar for discussions of this issue. 
159  I make this point at supra note 91. 
160  Stein, “Uncertainty”, supra note 91 at 300. 
161  Cardozo, supra note 135 at 8. 
162  Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1046. 
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tion to all other evidential sources before the fact-finder. As I have argued 
elsewhere, the devil is in the details.163 
B.  The Structure of Inference Causation 
 I have argued in this paper that the structure of juristic proof, while 
veritistic, is distinct from the structure by which propositions are scien-
tifically verified. As a result, neither the existence of an evidentiary gap 
nor scientific demurral from bridging that gap excuses the fact-finder 
from proceeding further in the causal inquiry. Reliance on scientific de-
murral as being determinative is, quite literally, unjust.164 Moreover, be-
cause complete evidentiary knowledge is impossible (i.e., always laden 
with gaps), legal fact-finding would grind to a halt were it to operate in 
isolation from the human judgment inherent in the cognitive processes 
brought to bear upon the evidence.165 This is particularly so where the le-
gal fact-finder is called upon to adjust her understanding of the case in 
order to account for the complex nature of accumulating and intersecting 
trial evidence and soft variables such as trial phenomena. 
 On the one hand, the reality of legal fact-finding166 requires that we 
acknowledge the role of explanatory considerations as guides to the infer-
ences that legal fact-finders draw. And, where several propositions might 
explain a given event, legal fact-finders are naturally inclined to infer as a 
fact the proposition that best explains it. On the other hand, legal fact-
finders, in choosing to draw such an inference, must conform to the law’s 
concern for veritism.  
 I now proceed to consider whether reconciliation of these conflicting 
imperatives—accounting for the rough justice that underlies how legal 
fact-finders assess the relevance of particular bits of evidence, and the re-
quirement that facts that are found be not merely plausible but prob-
able—can be achieved by applying the insights of evidence theory. In do-
ing so, I will attempt to bring some structural discipline to the cognitive 
processes, which Pennington and Hastie demonstrated.167 Ultimately, I 
seek to defend those processes as comprising a normative phenomenon.  
                                                  
163  Brown, “Expanding Hegemony”, supra note 5 at 442. It may be a matter of ecumenical 
preference; Burns writes that “God is in the details”: Burns, “Some Realism”, supra 
note 152 at 757 [emphasis added]. 
164  See text accompanying note 85-86. 
165  I am understanding “evidence” here as “total evidence” (see text accompanying notes 
61-64). 
166  See especially Pennington & Hastie, “Cognitive Theory”, supra note 97. 
167  Ibid. 
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 Structural discipline requires a measure of veritistic rigour that is not 
obvious, for example, in some of the most important, recent theorizing of 
the trial as an instance of “storytelling”.168 Robert Burns, for example, 
while viewing evidence as being “necessarily organized [by legal fact-
finders] in narrative form,” argues that narratives are generally persua-
sive because of “normative considerations that emerge from the narra-
tives themselves.”169 While Burns’s positive account of legal fact-finding is 
unobjectionable—indeed, it simply reiterates the epistemic reality re-
vealed and explicated by Pennington and Hastie170—his normative claim 
arguably drifts into emotivism by privileging the legal fact-finder’s own 
preferences. At the very least, his focus on “normative considerations that 
emerge from the narratives themselves”171 fails to privilege the evidence 
and ignores the particular question of fact to be determined. While any 
purely narrative model is logically and epistemologically superior to the 
probabilistic models because it dovetails with how legal fact-finders treat 
evidence,172 the normative significance of any narrative must be drawn, at 
least inter alia, from the fact that it accounts for evidence, and not from 
the narrative itself. In short, the plaintiff should win where the legal fact-
finder thought the plaintiff’s account of the facts seemed the most prob-
able and plausible of all competing accounts, and not because the plain-
tiff’s story itself evoked considerations that the legal fact-finder thought to 
be normatively significant. Otherwise, the plaintiff might as well succeed 
on account of the cut of his jib. 
 For this paper’s purposes, however, any tenable theory must account 
for the empirical fact that the process of legal fact-finding entails generat-
ing potential explanations of the evidence. Having heard the explanations, 
the fact-finder then turns to selecting the best probable explanation (the 
one that best explains the evidence) as more likely than all the others to 
be true, and thus to stand as “truth”. Various evidence theorists—Ronald 
J. Allen in particular—have conceptualized this structure as also compris-
ing the framework of a normative process dubbed as “inference to the best 
explanation”173 (IBE), which is shorthand for “the idea that explanatory 
                                                  
168  This lack of rigour also opens inference causation to criticism from probabilists. See 
James Brook, “The Blue Bus Stop: On Professors’ Stories and the Stories Plaintiffs Tell” 
(1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 621 at 623 (Comment on Allen, “Nature of Juridical Proof”, 
supra note 147). 
169  Burns, “Some Realism”, supra note 152 at 756-57. 
170  Indeed, Burns cites Pennington and Hastie’s work (see ibid. at 751-53). 
171  Ibid. at 757. 
172  Pennington & Hastie, “Cognitive Theory”, supra note 97. 
173  Amalia Amaya, “Inference to the Best Legal Explanation” in Hendrik Kaptein, Henry 
Prakken & Bart Verheij, eds., Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories, Logic 
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considerations guide inferences during the proof process and that these 
considerations therefore themselves explain the ... phenomena under dis-
cussion.”174 IBE mirrors the two-stage process of legal fact-finding: poten-
tial explanations are offered by the parties or constructed by the fact-
finder, and are then assessed with reference to explanatory criteria. 
[I]n civil cases fact-finders ought to infer the best explanation (and 
find for the party whom it favours) from the competing explanations 
offered by the parties or additional explanations fact-finders con-
struct for themselves.175 
In the first stage, the parties themselves do the heavy lifting, offering 
competing versions of events in order to explain the evidence. The plain-
tiff (or the party with the burden of proof) offers versions that address the 
formal substantive elements comprising his claim, while the defendant of-
fers versions that omit one or more of those elements and addresses the 
formal substantive elements of any affirmative defences. In the second 
stage, those explanations of events—and any other explanations that 
have been constructed by the legal fact-finder—are considered for plausi-
bility relative to the evidence. The defendant’s strongest counterargument 
to the plaintiff’s case, then, will be a competing narrative—that is, “an-
other way to order the information into coherency.”176  
 IBE, at least as Allen conceives it, thus conforms to the empirically 
demonstrated cognitive reasoning processes of legal fact-finders. Factual 
conclusions are formulated by developing narratives of events to account 
for the evidence.177 These narratives will consist of various subsets of the 
events that are said by one party or another to suggest a causal relation-
ship. Ultimately, based on the preferred narrative, cause-in-fact may or 
may not be inferred by the legal fact-finder. The preferred narrative, 
moreover, might be one constructed by the fact-finder herself; although 
Allen has equivocated on this point,178 there is no reason to restrict the ac-
      
(Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2009) 135 at 135; Allen, “Factual Ambiguity”, supra note 76; 
Allen & Callen, “Juridical Management”, supra note 81; Allen & Pardo, “Mathematical 
Models”, supra note 82; Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, “Probability, Explanation 
and Inference: A Reply” (2007) 11 Int’l J. of Evidence & Proof 307 [Allen & Pardo, 
“Probability”]; Pardo, supra note 119. 
174  Allen & Pardo, “Probability”, supra note 173 at 315. 
175  Ibid. at 316. 
176  Jonakait, supra note 109 at 347. 
177  See also Callen, “Kicking Rocks”, supra note 81 at 443; John Leubsdorf, “Stories and 
Numbers”, Comment, (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 455 at 458. 
178  Ronald J. Allen, “A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials” (1986) 66 B.U.L. Rev. 401 at 
432-34. Compare Allen & Pardo, “Probability”, supra note 173 at 316. 
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ceptable alternative scenarios to those posed by the parties.179 Otherwise, 
fact-finding might not be as accurate as it could be. Parties will, after all, 
propose narratives that are untrue, sometimes because the truth is un-
helpful, and sometimes because they simply do not know what happened. 
At the very least, parties have incentives to propose the narrative that fa-
vours their interests. Legal fact-finders should be free to accept any nar-
rative that makes sense of the evidence, even if it means accepting their 
own account rather than accepting one party’s version of events or strik-
ing a compromise between the parties’ competing versions of events. Be-
cause any conclusion by a fact-finder that contradicts her own judgment 
regarding the forensic possibilities lacks epistemic justification, justice re-
quires a fact-finder to reject any account that simply does not sound 
right.180  
 However the explanations are constructed, the essential idea remains 
that the parties tender evidential sources, whose probative value depends 
on the strength of these explanations that they support.181 Determining 
the strength of the respective explanations is a matter of asking not only 
which inferences are reasonably supported by the evidence, but also 
whether the facts are compatible with one or more hypotheses. As Allen 
and Pardo have explicated: 
An item of evidence is relevant if it is explained by the particular ex-
planation offered by the party tendering the evidence, assuming the 
explanation matters to a fact of consequence to the substantive law. 
The probative value of this evidence will depend on the strength of 
the pertinent explanation: the more it is explained, the more proba-
tive; the less it is explained, the less so. The strength of the desired 
inference will depend on all the other relevant evidence and any 
competing (contrasting) explanations.182 
                                                  
179  I am presupposing here that where a judicially constructed account favours the plain-
tiff, such an account can reasonably be said to fall within the factual scope of the plain-
tiff’s pleadings. Otherwise, as a matter of natural justice, the defendant cannot be li-
able, since she has not had the opportunity to know the case to be met. 
180  See also Allan Beever, “Cause-in-Fact: Two Steps out of the Mire” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 
327 (“the findings of a court should not be inconsistent with the laws of nature or of 
logic” at 344).  
181  Tillers, supra note 47 at 917, n. 59: 
The judge, when inquiring into the relative strength of [a particular hypothe-
sis against a competing hypothesis], is not a scientist trying to determine 
which general laws are most strongly supported by the available [statistical] 
data. The judge typically asks which factual hypotheses are most strongly 
supported by the evidence in the case. 
182  Allen & Pardo, “Probability”, supra note 173 at 317. 
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As Wright expresses it, “we cannot infer that the causal law underlying 
the causal generalization also has been instantiated unless we can rule 
out competing causal generalizations.”183 Here again, the reference point 
must be the evidence put before the fact-finder.184  
 Of course, there is a circularity to IBE in that the explanation and the 
underlying evidence are mutually reinforcing.185 The evidence under con-
sideration justifies the belief that the explanation is correct, while the ex-
planation is used to clarify the evidence. As Allen and Pardo have demon-
strated, however, scientific hypotheses are also circular in that they are 
mutually reinforced by the same phenomena they seek to explain.186 
Moreover, this understanding of the circular structure of juristic proof has 
the advantage of being able to aggregate the evidence in a way that ac-
counts for actual cognitive capacities and processes, unlike Bayes’s theo-
rem. Potential explanations are considered in light of new evidence in a 
manner that accords with a legal fact-finder’s provisional assessment of 
the “original” evidence. This provisional assessment, like the Bayesians’ 
prior probability, will not be expressed in statistically reliable terms. My 
claim is not that inference causation is without problems, but that it is re-
flective of the epistemology and the (relatively) relaxed threshold of legal 
fact-finding. Hence, for juristic purposes, it is normatively superior to 
slavish adherence to scientific fact-finding. 
 Inference causation’s superiority can be maintained, however, only if 
IBE’s process of constructing and comparing narratives is undertaken 
with reference to the evidence, free of idiosyncratic value judgments. 
While critics of IBE (or of inference causation generally) may be suspi-
cious of the inherent risk that a legal fact-finder might fudge cause-in-fact 
on emotivist grounds, that risk is an unavoidable concomitant of the epis-
temology of legal fact-finding. To reduce that risk, one can scrutinize 
judgments to ensure that the underlying factual conclusions are oriented 
                                                  
183  Wright, “Bramble Bush”, supra note 31 at 1051. 
184  Wright adds: 
[P]articularistic evidence can negate the instantiation of one of the abstract 
elements in a competing causal generalization or lower the ex post probabil-
ity that it was instantiated, thereby eliminating the competing causal gener-
alization or lowering the ex post causal probability associated with it. On the 
other hand, particularistic evidence can support the competing causal gener-
alization by establishing that one or more of the abstract elements in the 
competing causal generalization was actually or probably instantiated (ibid.). 
185  Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, “Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation” (2008) 
27 L. & Phil. 223 at 233 [Pardo & Allen, “Juridical Proof”]. 
186  Ibid. at 233 (“The law of gravity explains why everyday objects fall and the speed at 
which they do so; these observable events justify belief in the accuracy of the theory un-
der ordinary conditions”). 
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toward the evidence. Assuming that sources of evidence and inference are 
dual bases for conclusions about past events,187 evidentiary sources must 
be taken seriously because they immunize the process from pure caprice.  
 What happens, however, when both parties offer improbable explana-
tions? In this event, the solution advanced by Allen and Pardo drifts from 
the legal imperative of veritism: “If both parties offer poor explanations, 
jurors should find for the better of the two parties’ explanations (unless 
they can construct a better one for themselves, based on the evidence they 
have heard).”188 More recently, they have explained, “[T]he key point is 
the comparative aspect of the process. A verdict will (and should) be ren-
dered for the better (or best available) explanation, whether one of the 
parties’ or another constructed by the fact-finder.”189 The sole reference 
point, according to Allen (here writing alone) is “the commitment to ra-
tionality.”190 A verdict is therefore entered for whichever party offers the 
more plausible account, however implausible it may be, and irrespective 
of whether it satisfactorily accounts for the totality of the evidence at 
trial.191 
 This solution is deeply flawed. As I have already pointed out, legal 
fact-finding occurs within a range below a total probability of {1.0}. A 
court will never have before it all the explanatory hypotheses; thus all the 
known possibilities, taken together, will never add up to a total probabil-
ity of {1.0}. The legal fact-finding challenge is not, then, to ensure that the 
account chosen in aggregate adds up to {1.0}. It remains necessary, how-
ever, for the account to meet a threshold of probability. The problem with 
Allen and Pardo’s solution—that we infer to the best explanation, even if 
that explanation is not even likely to be true—is that it does not conform, 
or at least does not necessarily conform, to the legal imperative of meeting 
a probability threshold. I have attempted to show that inference causation 
is not only immanent in a particular process of rational reasoning, but is 
also normatively desirable because it is veritistic. It takes seriously the 
reference point of evidence, albeit subject to the inherently uncertain civil 
standard of proof that legal fact-finders apply. Inference causation is 
therefore insufficient to form the substance of an inference of fact with an 
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explanation that is merely the most easily justified in reference to the in-
ferential criteria. The fact-finder must view the chosen explanation not 
only as a rational explanation or the best among several possible rational 
explanations, but also as a probable account of the linkage (or absence 
thereof) between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s suffering. 
In short, IBE ought to be IBPE: inference to the best probable explana-
tion.  
 What if the explanations are equally good (or bad)? Again, Allen and 
Pardo offer a method of deciding that, with a qualification, is acceptable: 
“If the explanations are so bad (or good) that the jurors cannot decide be-
tween them, then the decision should go against the party with the bur-
den of persuasion on the issue.”192 It follows from this method that the 
judgment should go against the party with the burden of persuasion not 
only when all explanations are equally bad, but also when they are un-
equally bad, yet still bad enough that none of them meets the threshold of 
probability. If an explanation is not even likely to be true, it must be re-
jected. 
 To be found liable, the defendant must have somehow increased the 
risk to the plaintiff under circumstances that allow us to infer that he 
probably caused the plaintiff’s suffering—that is, under circumstances 
that allow us to compensate for our lack of knowledge of whether causal 
mechanisms were actualized in a particular case by applying our knowl-
edge of a correlation between risk and suffering.193 But what are those cir-
cumstances? More specifically, what are the criteria that tend to make 
one particular narrative more likely to be true than its competitor, 
thereby making an inference of cause-in-fact more reliable than its nega-
tion? A complete answer is impossible. If Wright’s observation that cause-
in-fact is a “complex and subtle” concept that “long has resisted efforts to 
articulate a precise definition”194 is correct, it follows that a Rosetta stone 
decrypting the cognitive processes by which “the mind can reassure it-
self”195 in determining cause-in-fact must be even more elusive. Evidence 
theorists and others have postulated various (and occasionally inconsis-
tent) factors, including simplicity,196 consistency,197 coherence or consil-
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ience,198 “coverage”,199 “uniqueness”,200 and the temporal association be-
tween risk and suffering.201 Some of these qualities have been emphasized 
by Pennington and Hastie, whose work has demonstrated that, as an em-
pirical matter, jurors appear to focus on coherence, completeness, and 
uniqueness in selecting the preferred narrative.202 David Danks, a compu-
tational cognitive scientist whose work involves developing models to pre-
dict linkages between causal observations and inference, has emphasized 
inter alia the temporal association between risk and suffering.203 Epide-
miologists have also devised criteria for when an inductive leap from sta-
tistical association to causation might be justified, including some of the 
foregoing, including temporality.204 “Temporal precedence” of the risk 
relative to the suffering is also emphasized by computer scientist Judea 
Pearl and engineer T.S. Verma as being significant and possibly necessary 
for linking statistical association and causation, although they caution 
that, on its own, temporal precedence may be insufficient to distinguish 
genuine cause-in-fact from spurious associations caused by unknown fac-
tors.205 
 Temporal precedence suggests an explanation for the divergent treat-
ment of the respective plaintiffs in Snell and in the House of Lords deci-
sion in Wilsher,206 the case that Justice Sopinka relied on (in addition to 
McGhee) as an authority for inference causation. In Wilsher, the prema-
ture infant, while only hours old, was negligently oxidized through his 
umbilical vein instead of an artery, resulting in his being supersaturated 
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with oxygen. From one week to nearly six weeks after birth, the plaintiff 
was monitored negligently; as a result, he was again exposed to danger-
ously high levels of oxygen. The plaintiff subsequently developed retrolen-
tal fibroplasia (RLF), resulting in blindness. While RLF could have been 
caused by the overoxydization, it was likely (but not certain) that the 
plaintiff suffered from one or more of five possible conditions, any of which 
might have caused RLF on its own. In the House of Lords, Lord Bridge 
made the observation that the majority in McGhee had concluded that it 
was a legitimate inference of fact that the defenders’ negligence had ma-
terially contributed to the pursuer’s injury.207 On the facts of Wilsher, 
however, it was not possible to make that inference.208 
 Why were there different outcomes as to whether it was possible to 
judge where the balance of probabilities lay in Snell and Wilsher? Al-
though the reasoning in both cases is peremptory, the facts and outcomes 
suggest that the temporal association between the defendant’s risk and 
the plaintiff’s suffering may have been seen as significant. In Snell, we 
are not told how long the plaintiff had suffered with the pre-existing 
sources of risk, but given her advanced age, it is likely that she had suf-
fered from them for a substantially longer period of time than the few 
hours of lifespan that preceded the negligent treatment of the plaintiff in 
Wilsher.  
 In considering the factor of temporal association, then, a legal fact-
finder might be less reluctant to infer a causal link from facts resembling 
those in Snell than she would be from those in Wilsher. In Snell, perhaps 
sufficient time had passed since the onset of the pre-existing sources of 
risk for the temporal association between the defendant’s negligence and 
the plaintiff’s blindness to support a finding of cause-in-fact. Even if the 
temporal association did not support a definitive causal link, it might 
have still been possible to conclude that the facts of Snell were more sug-
gestive of a causal link than those of Wilsher, where there was no case 
history and therefore no information about whether the pre-existing 
sources of risk had ever become symptomatic. 
 I do not, however, intend to suggest that the criteria for inference cau-
sation can be reduced to temporal association, or even to any of the other 
criteria that I have mentioned. Nor do I propose to consider in this paper 
the individual or collective strengths and weaknesses of these criteria. If 
the cognitive dynamics surrounding proof are complex, then debates over 
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the criteria according to which those dynamics support inferences of proof 
are even more so. The work of evidence scholars like Allen has led to 
doubts about the feasibility of describing or reproducing those processes of 
cognitive dynamics.209 Moreover, efforts to borrow from the insights of 
other disciplines inevitably suffer from “severe problems of communica-
tion,” not only because of mutual inaccessibility but because of divergent 
understandings of what is relevant: “What is viewed as interesting or vi-
tal in one discipline may be viewed as tedious and boring in another.”210 
 I can only note that these criteria might usefully serve as qualities 
against which the narratives constructed from the evidence can be meas-
ured, thereby reconciling the veritistic reference point of the evidence 
with the epistemology of legal fact-finding. Briefly put, these criteria may 
contribute to what H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré describe as “special co-
gency” in the evidence.211 This statement might invite the objection that 
such special cogency is not enough because it still allows fact-finders to 
fudge cause-in-fact. This objection, however, falls flat, and not merely be-
cause of the need for finality in adjudication or the unavoidably inferen-
tial nature of legal fact-finding. Complaints about fudging also fail be-
cause they are grounded upon the dubiously pessimistic assumption that 
legal fact-finders do not act in good faith by observing the ethical impera-
tive of applying good judgment to the evidence. Judgment, as Anthony 
Kronman reminds us, is not the same as intuition:  
If judgment is conceived of as a process of reflection followed by a 
moment of intuitive insight, then our assessment of the soundness of 
a particular judgment can never depend on the reasons given to 
support it, since ... [its quality] will be a function of its intuitive bril-
liance and originality and these are qualities that, by assumption, no 
reasoned argument can express.212  
This conclusion is wrong because for good judgment to be seen as such, it 
must provide not only insight but also a compelling account. In other 
words, judgment’s “argumentative dimension” distinguishes it from intui-
tion,213 bringing it within the category of what Hart described as “charac-
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teristic judicial virtues” that judges should use in cases requiring discre-
tion.214 
 Justly applied, then, IBE is no more an instance of intuition than it is 
of deductive, scientific reasoning. Rather, it entails drawing and ulti-
mately justifying a factual determination, including one of cause-in-fact. 
IBE requires simply that a legal fact-finder “give each alternative its due” 
and “entertain all the possibilities by feeling for himself what is most at-
tractive in each.”215 In the end, consigning cause-in-fact to a judgment call, 
literally speaking, should not leave an observer in the dark about why 
cause-in-fact is or is not found in a given instance. Legal fact-finders must 
be able to offer some rational explanation that earns public acceptance of 
the factual determination being made. For example, the temporal associa-
tion between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s blindness in 
Snell, combined with the prior asymptomology of the pre-existing sources 
of risk, might offer a rational, coherent, and deliberative (and therefore 
acceptable, if not universally agreed upon) grounding for a causal link. 
Conclusion 
 Critics of inference causation may dislike its lack of determinacy, but 
indeterminacy is a plainly unavoidable concomitant of legal fact-finding, 
not a defect in inference causation. The mere fact that inference causation 
leaves open an opportunity for substituting emotivist fudging for good-
faith, deliberative fact-finding is, on its own, a feeble indictment; tort law 
is replete with opportunities to fudge—on the “reasonableness” of the de-
fendant’s conduct, on the “closeness and directness” of her relationship in 
law to the plaintiff, and on the “foreseeability” of the suffering. The alter-
native espoused by critics of inference causation—relying upon scientific 
fact-finding, which operates at a more severe threshold—has been shown 
to be untenable. Moreover, critics’ insistence upon probabilistic evidence 
connecting risk with suffering has obscured the mutually distinct episte-
mologies of legal and scientific fact-finding. In the end, even though en-
couraging legal fact-finders to confine inference causation to the “best 
probable explanation” leaves room for indeterminacy, it may be the closest 
we can come to facing epistemic reality without falling into emotivist error. 
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